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A Preemptive Copyright Ghost Lurking in 
Breach of Contract Claims:  Resolving the 
Copyright Preemption Analysis 
Jessica Nguyen 
INTRODUCTION 
Supernatural activity has overtaken copyright law, reigniting the 
pressure to resolve significant legal issues after a period of quiet unrest.1 
Ghost Hunters, a Syfy channel reality show following investigators as they 
study paranormal activity, has provided more than intrigue to viewers every 
Wednesday night; it has intensified an ongoing debate among the thirteen 
judicial circuits.2 While a paranormal team investigates the ghost of a 
colonel lurking in a Kentucky distillery on next week’s Ghost Hunters 
episode,3 parapsychologist Larry Montz continues to wage his legal battle 
against NBC Universal (NBC) and Pilgrim Films & Television.4 Montz 
 
  J.D. Candidate 2013, Chapman University School of Law. B.S. 2009 New York University. I 
would like to acknowledge Professor Judd Funk and Professor John Tehranian for their guidance, 
advice, and highly entertaining stories that heavily shaped this Comment and my perspective on a 
career in the entertainment industry. I am tremendously thankful to my family and friends. Their 
unconditional love and support have pushed me to work hard and strive for the best in everything I do. 
And finally, I am especially grateful to Ryan Maughan for his understanding and encouragement during 
the writing of this Comment.  
 1 Anna Buono, Ninth Circuit Revives California Idea Submission Claims, MEDIA LAW MONITOR 
(June 13, 2011), http://www.medialawmonitor.com/2011/06/ninth-circuit-revives-california-idea-
submission-claims (noting that the decision of the en banc panel in Montz v. Pilgrim Films & 
Television, Inc., 649 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2011), revived state law claims that had been regarded as 
preempted by copyright law).  
 2  See Montz, 649 F.3d at 977–78. 
 3 Ghost Hunters, Episode: “Distillery of Spirits,” TV GUIDE, http://www.tvguide.com/ 
tvshows/ghost-hunters-2011/episode-23-season-7/distillery-of-spirits/191528 (last visited Nov. 5, 
2011). 
 4 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Pilgrim Films & Television, Inc. v. Montz, No. 11–143, 
2011 WL 3380764, at *2 (U.S. Aug. 2, 2011) (requesting the Supreme Court to grant certiorari and to 
rule on an issue of law that will provide guidance to lower courts because this type of conflict 
continually arises); Pilgrim Films & Television, Inc. v. Montz, 132 S. Ct. 550, 550 (2011) (denying 
certiorari to hear the Montz case). The acceptance or denial of certiorari is a strategic move by the 
Supreme Court. See RICHARD L. PACELLE, JR., BRETT W. CURRY & BRYAN W. MARSHALL, DECISION 
MAKING BY THE MODERN SUPREME COURT 40–41 (2011) 
A justice who may wish to reverse a lower court decision nevertheless votes to deny 
certiorari because she realizes that her preferred case outcome is unlikely to prevail at the 
merits stage. . . . [H]er strategic action of defensively denying cert may have prevented an 
affirmance that would have taken on precedential value. . . . Alternatively, a strategic 
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claims that he first pitched the idea of a show following paranormal 
investigators to NBC and the Syfy channel.5 But both declined to use the 
idea.6 NBC then produced Ghost Hunters for the Syfy channel, which 
resulted in Montz v. Pilgrim Films & Television, Inc.7 Montz wound its way 
up to the Supreme Court where the entertainment industry rushed to have 
its say.8 The immediate issue in the Montz case was whether federal 
copyright law preempted Montz’s state claims for breach of implied 
contract and breach of confidence.9 The test that many courts employ to 
resolve whether state claims are worthy of surviving preemption has left 
plaintiffs, defendants, writers, and the media industry with little guidance. 
This Comment proposes a new test with a clear set of factors to determine 
what it takes for a state law claim to avoid preemption. 
Part I will explain the dynamics of the entertainment industry, the 
formation of implied contracts in the entertainment industry, and the 
industry’s business structure, which favors media companies and 
established producers. Part II will discuss the basic foundation of federal 
copyright law, the necessity of preemption to maintain copyright law, and 
the role of the “extra element” test in parsing out preempted claims. Part III 
will examine how the “extra element” test has been applied in different 
ways among the courts. Finally, Part IV will propose a new test with a 
distinct set of factors that should be used in lieu of the “extra element” test. 
I.  CONTRACTING FOR IDEAS IN THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 
The entertainment industry regularly strikes deals, allowing innovators 
to create the products consumers enjoy most: movies, television shows, 
music, and video games.10 The transactions are fluid and efficient because 
 
justice may vote to hear a case—or pursue an ‘aggressive grant’ of certiorari—when he 
thinks his preferred policy outcome will be reflected in the Court’s ultimate decision on the 
merits. 
Id.; see also Eriq Gardner, Supreme Court Deals Setback to Hollywood, Won’t Hear Key ‘Ghost 
Hunters’ Case, THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Nov. 7, 2011, 1:59 PM), 
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/ghost-hunters-trial-syfy-nbc-universal-258280 (noting that 
the denial of certiorari of the Montz case leaves studios open to more lawsuits). 
 5 Montz, 649 F.3d at 978. 
 6 Id.  
 7 Id. 
 8 See Press Release, Kelley Drye Files Amicus Brief for U.S. Supreme Court Review of Montz 
Case (Sept. 16, 2011), available at http://www.kelleydrye.com/news/press_releases/ 
2254 (announcing that a Los Angeles law firm filed an amicus brief on behalf of the defendants, asking 
the Supreme Court to review the Montz case because the law firm constantly faced litigation in the areas 
of copyright and idea submission claims). 
Many parties are affected by a decision such as this and if the Supreme Court had granted review, its 
finding would have had broad implications. See Decision Against NBC Universal for Use of Pitched 
Television Show Concept Without Compensation/Credit Being Appealed to Supreme Court, ARENT 
FOX, (Oct. 10, 2011), http://www.arentfox.com/ 
publications/index.cfm?fa=legalUpdateDisp&content_id=3353 (“Multiple parties are seeking leave to 
file amicus briefs in the matter.”).   
 9 Montz, 649 F.3d at 977–79. 
 10 See MARK LITWAK, DEALMAKING IN THE FILM & TELEVISION INDUSTRY 11 (2d. ed. 2002) 
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the entertainment industry is built on relationships, custom, and courses of 
dealing through the repeated interactions of writers, producers, actors, 
directors, and studios.11 For example, studios will typically only accept 
ideas for new films, television shows, or books from writers who use an 
agent.12 The agent acts as a gateway, regulating the relationship between 
idea creators and the studio.13 Any unsolicited ideas submitted without 
representation by an agent are returned to the writer.14 An agent has an 
established reputation in the entertainment industry allowing him to 
negotiate on behalf of a writer to get the best deal possible.15 Therefore, a 
person’s reputation in the entertainment industry is a crucial component of 
maintaining expectations, transacting in business, and making deals.16 
A key component to exchanges in the entertainment industry is 
acceptance of the implied contract.17 The implied contract recognizes a 
 
(noting that there is more dealmaking than ever before in the movie industry). 
There are a wide range of deals available in the entertainment industry such as cash up front (money is 
guaranteed), back-end deal (a portion of the cash is taken up front but a share of the product’s profit is 
also taken), working for scale (taking a large pay cut and accepting only the mandated minimum 
amount of money proscribed by organizations like guilds and unions), and tit for tat (trading something 
for another). See Daniel Fierman, Terms of En-deal-ment, ENTERTAINMENTWEEKLY.COM (Mar. 3, 
2000), http://www.ew.com/ 
ew/article/0,,275563,00.html.  
 11 See Kirk T. Schroder, Entertainment Law: Some Practice Considerations For Beginners, 13 
ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 8, 10 (1996) (“[T]he entertainment industry thrives on relationships.”); STEPHEN 
F. BREIMER, ESQ., THE SCREENWRITER’S LEGAL GUIDE 172–73 (2d ed. 1999) (establishing that 
“relationship protection” exists in the entertainment industry: “Agents would not submit material or set 
up meetings if there was a substantial risk that their clients might be ripped off as a result of such pitch 
meetings”).  
A course of dealing refers to the conduct before the agreement in question. JOHN D. CALAMARI & 
JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 161 (4th ed. 1998). It is the series of previous conduct 
between two parties to a particular transaction that “establish[es] a common basis of understanding for 
interpreting their expressions and other conduct.” Id. (quoting UCC § 1–205(1)). See also LITWAK, 
supra note 10, at 251 (“[A]gents, attorneys, studio executives and producers regularly conduct business 
with one another and observe an unwritten code of behavior.”). 
 12 See Neta-Li E. Gottlieb, Free To Air?—Legal Protection For TV Program Formats, 51 IDEA: 
THE INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 211, 230 (2011) (observing that the relationship between agent and the 
studio/producer is mutual because the producers rely on the agents to get new ideas). 
 13 See LITWAK, supra note 10, at 353 (describing how agents will not push too hard on some deal 
terms because they will have to negotiate with that same person again in the future); MIKE MEDAVOY 
ET AL., THE MOVIE BUSINESS BOOK 100 (Jason E. Squire ed., 2d ed. 1992) (“The agent can help to 
keep lines of communication open between writer and buyer and to work out problems that might arise 
from misunderstandings or differences of opinion.”). 
 14 See Jonathan H. Anschell, Jennifer B. Hodulik & Allison S. Rohrer, The Whole Enchilada: 
Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp. and Idea Submission Claims, 21 COMM. LAW., no. 4, 2008, at 1, 27 
(indicating that a defendant is in a good position to challenge a state law idea submission claim if the 
plaintiff’s submission was unsolicited). 
 15 See LITWAK, supra note 10, at 353 (describing how agents can negotiate routine deals for 
clients without the help of a lawyer). 
 16 See Gottlieb, supra note 12, at 230 (noting that an “agent’s livelihood is based on her 
reputation”); PHILIP H. MILLER, MEDIA LAW FOR PRODUCERS 29 (4th ed. 2003) (“Like any business, 
the business of media production involves managing many working relationships.”). The success of a 
project depends on how the relationships are managed. Id. Entertainment industry professionals take 
pride in keeping their word. LITWAK, supra note 10, at 251.  
 17 See Anna R. Buono & Alonzo Wickers IV, Montz v. Pilgrim Films & Television, Inc.: 
Copyright Preemption and Idea Submission Cases, 28 COMM. LAW, no. 2, 2011 at 4, (recognizing that 
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mutual agreement between a producer and writer:18 if the producer uses the 
writer’s idea, then the writer will be compensated.19 This agreement may 
not be captured in written form, but is merely understood by all the parties 
involved. The implied contract is a useful tool to get around a written 
agreement.20 No express written agreement is necessary, or even preferred, 
given that the fast-paced nature of the entertainment business calls for 
efficiency and speed.21 The process of negotiating and drafting long-form 
contracts for every deal impedes the flow of business.22 Similarly, if the 
implied contract is breached, most cases settle to ensure business 
 
California law accepts the custom where a producer and author approach a pitch meeting with the 
“mutual understanding that the author will be compensated and credited if the producer uses her 
ideas”); see also Stanley v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 221 P.2d 73, 85 (Cal. 1950) (Traynor, J., dissenting) 
(noting that it is not unreasonable to imply “that one would obligate himself to pay for an idea that 
would otherwise be free to use”). 
There are two types of implied contracts in contract law: the implied-in-fact contract and the implied-in-
law contract. The words or conduct demonstrating the agreement of the parties to a contract give rise to 
an implied-in-fact contract. See 1 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS 35 (4th ed. 2007). An 
implied-in-law contract, on the other hand, does not require a meeting of the minds but is a concept 
imposed by the fiction of law for reasons of justice. See Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 
456 (6th Cir. 2001); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 (1981); see also Caroline Cnty. v. 
Dashiell, 747 A.2d 600, 606 (Md. 2000) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 324 (6th ed. 1990)) 
(defining an implied-in-law contract as one where circumstances justify implying a contract where none 
existed, especially in cases where parties place others in the wrong and equity commands that the 
situation should not have taken place).  
 18 See Forest Park Pictures v. Universal Television Network, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 5168(CM), 2011 
WL 1792587, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2011) (alleging that the defendants knew at all times that ideas 
are pitched to studios in order to sell those ideas in return for payment and that it is a standard in the 
entertainment industry that ideas are pitched with “the expectation of compensation in the event of 
use”); Thompson v. Cal. Brewing Co., 12 Cal. Rptr. 783, 786 (Cal. Dist. App. 1961) (holding that it is 
possible for a payment agreement to be implied from the circumstances); Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d 
257, 270 (Cal. 1956) (stating that the circumstances are known to the idea receiver before the idea is 
conveyed and the receiver accepts the idea disclosure with the conditions that accompany it, i.e. 
payment); Chandler v. Roach, 319 P.2d 776, 780 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958) (describing the writer’s assent as 
submitting his idea to the producer and the producer’s assent as his acceptance of the materials).  
 19 Desny, 299 P.2d at 269 (clarifying that where a producer is the beneficiary of an author’s idea 
and the producer profits from that idea, there is no reason why the producer should not be able to agree 
to pay for that idea). 
Ideas conveyed to a producer or studio can be bargained for and constitute “valuable consideration” 
because the producer holds it as his own and may use it as he sees fit after the acquisition. Id.; see also 
High v. Trade Union Courier Publ’g Corp., 31 Misc. 2d 7, 8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1946) (noting that even if an 
idea is common knowledge, it can constitute consideration in a promise to pay if the disclosure of the 
idea is protected by contract). 
 20 See Michael S. Bogner, Comment, The Problem with Handshakes: An Evaluation of Oral 
Agreements in the United States Film Industry, 28 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 359, 359 (2004) (stating that 
the film business is a “handshake business” and relationships in the film industry are based on the 
handshake); see also BROOKE A. WHARTON, THE WRITER GOT SCREWED (BUT DIDN’T HAVE TO) 53 
(1997) (stating that while most contracts are not enforceable unless they are signed, the entertainment 
industry has nothing to do with those types of contracts). 
 21 See Bogner, supra note 20, at 377 (reasoning that the speed of deals requires an agreement 
between parties even before lawyers can negotiate and execute a written contract); see also IATSE LOC. 
336, http://www.iatse-336.org/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2012). 
 22 See Bogner, supra note 20, at 375 (finding that complex deal points are negotiated for long 
periods of time until they are reduced into a long-form contract and that lawyers may stunt quick deal 
resolutions because they demand more detail); see also WHARTON, supra note 20, at 52 (noting that 
most contracts do not have to be in writing to be enforceable). The contracts in the entertainment 
industry that must be in writing are work-for-hire contracts, assignments, and licenses. Id. at 54. 
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consistency.23 Therefore, the implied contract is important to the proper 
functioning and maintenance of the entertainment industry. 
While it would be ideal for writers and studios to hold an equal share 
of the power in an entertainment industry business relationship, this is 
simply not the case.24 The lion’s share of power is in the hands of 
producers and well-established media companies.25 This imbalance is due 
to several circumstances: (1) the disproportionate number of writers to 
producers/studios;26 (2) the use of releases by studios and producers to limit 
the amount of ideas they receive;27 and (3) the “independent creation” 
defense available to producers when they are sued.28 
First, the number of people clamoring to get into the entertainment 
industry is staggering.29 Studios have their pick of ideas and personnel. The 
nature of supply and demand weighs heavily against the writers. 
Second, producers and studios are at liberty to demand that a writer 
sign a release before submitting an idea, which waives a writer’s rights to 
his material.30 A producer or studio manages the number of submissions 
they receive by refusing to accept unsolicited ideas unless a release has 
been signed.31 But a writer who submits his ideas through an agent usually 
does not have to sign a release.32 Therefore, writers without an agent are in 
the feeble position of either waiving their rights or not having their ideas 
 
 23 Brian Devine, Free as the Air: Rethinking the Law of Story Ideas, 24 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. 
L.J. 355, 380 (2001). Lawsuits cost a lot of money and the amount of money at stake may not justify 
expending legal fees to proceed to litigation. LITWAK, supra note 10, at 342–43. 
 24 See Camilla M. Jackson, “I’ve Got This Great Idea for a Movie!” A Comparison of the Laws 
in California and New York That Protect Idea Submissions, 21 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 47, 58 
(1996) (“No one in Hollywood has as little power as the aspiring writer . . . and television and film 
studios have absolutely no incentive—legal or otherwise—to bargain fairly.”).  
 25 See Jonathan D. Cohen, Note, Remedies for Misappropriation of Motion Picture and 
Television Story Ideas, 7 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 85, 102 (1984) (“A free-lance writer dealing 
with a major independent producer does not do so on an equal footing.”).   
 26 See Jackson, supra note 24, at 58 (“Due to the small number of major television and movie 
studios, there is a limited number of people to whom the creator of an idea can submit his or her work. 
But the number of writers and other creative people who wish to sell ideas is virtually unlimited.”); see 
also BREIMER, supra note 11, at 8 (observing that there is a lot of competition in submitting ideas to 
movie studios).  
 27 Devine, supra note 23, at 385–86. 
 28 See Allison S. Brehm, Creative Defense, 33 L.A. LAW 28, 30 (2010) (noting how the 
“independent creation” defense plays a great role in defeating idea submission claims).  
 29  See Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, A Theory of IP’s Negative Space, 34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 317, 
328 (2010) (“[T]here is no shortage of new entertainment ideas or creators striving to break into the 
entertainment industry.”). 
 30 See Robert Yale Libott, Round the Prickly Pear: The Idea-Expression Fallacy in a Mass 
Communications World, 14 UCLA L. REV. 735, 764 (1966) (clarifying that a “release form” is a 
contract of adhesion that waives all right to sue).  
 31 See Devine, supra note 23, at 364–65 (discussing how the release is used as a tactic to protect 
producers/studios from liability in a lawsuit).  
 32 See WHARTON, supra note 20, at 25–26 (“In order to prevent the possibility of a lawsuit, most 
people in the entertainment business have decided to accept unsolicited work only from agents or 
lawyers, or after receiving a signed release form from the writer.”). An agent is an individual licensed to 
obtain work for individuals in the entertainment industry. Id. at 75. Agents play an important role as 
intermediaries for the writer and producer. Devine, supra note 23, at 365. 
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heard at all.33 Producers and studios can make their demands, knowing that 
they possess greater bargaining power than their writer counterparts.34 
Producers and studios are also better positioned to advantageously alter 
industry customs because they perpetually hold the upper hand.35 Writers 
are therefore left at the whim of the top “players” in the entertainment 
business.36 
Lastly, an independent creation defense arms studios and producers 
with a tool to rebut a writer’s breach of implied contract claim.37 The 
independent creation defense rebuts the plaintiff’s claim if a defendant can 
show he thought of the idea on his own.38 Even if the defendant produced 
the disputed work after he had access to the plaintiff’s idea, the defendant 
can still use the defense to defeat an idea submission claim.39 Once again, 
the studio  and the producer win. 
A writer that voluntarily chooses to venture into the entertainment 
business faces an ongoing struggle.40 He is forced to adhere to rules 
dictated by the opposing side.41 But in abiding by those rules, one of the 
strongest forms of protection that a writer can have over his work is a 
copyright.  
 
 33 Devine, supra note 23, at 386. See also WHARTON, supra note 20, at 29 (noting that signing a 
release will put writers in the position of feeling as if they are giving their work away). 
 34 Devine, supra note 23, at 386. 
 35 Id. at 385 (observing that producers can adjust their behavior in response to legal rules that 
could potentially affect their liability). 
 36 See Cohen, supra note 25, at 102 (noting that the relationship between a writer and producer is 
unbalanced); MARK LITWAK, CONTRACTS FOR THE FILM & TELEVISION INDUSTRY 5 (1998) 
(mentioning that it is difficult for writers to get in the door to see producers); LITWAK, supra note 10, at 
251 (referring to the top Hollywood dealmakers as “players”). 
 37 Allison S. Brehm, What’s the Use? A Primer on the Defense of Independent Creation to 
Combat Allegations of Idea Theft, 1 ARIZ. ST. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 94, 96–97 (2011). To prevail on a 
breach of implied contract claim, a plaintiff must prove: (1) he prepared the work; (2) he disclosed the 
work to the defendant; (3) the defendant voluntarily accepted the disclosure with knowledge of the 
circumstances; (4) the reasonable value of the work; and (5) the defendant used the plaintiff’s work. 
Star Patrol Enters., Inc. v. Saban Entm’t, Inc., 129 F.3d 127, at *1 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Klekas v. EMI 
Films, Inc., 198 Cal. Rptr. 296, 304 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)). See also Mann v. Columbia Pictures, Inc., 
180 Cal. Rptr. 522, 533 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (including an additional element that the defendant used 
the plaintiff’s idea, meaning that the defendant substantially based his work on the plaintiff’s ideas). 
 38 Brehm, supra note 37, at 96–97. 
 39 See id. at 110 (explaining that defendants can still use the independent creation defense even 
after the defendant has heard the plaintiff’s idea by showing that the defendant created the work without 
access to the plaintiff’s idea through producing declarations or showing the work was made from other 
sources). 
 40 See Cohen, supra note 25, at 102 (observing that where a producer and writer contract with 
each other, an enormous amount of power lays in the hands of the producer). “It is difficult to imagine 
any producer agreeing to terms that are substantially favorable to the writer, as the producer has access 
to a veritable sea of ideas, generated both by other outside free-lance hopefuls and by inside production 
personnel.” Id. 
 41 See Cohen, supra note 25, at 102. 
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II.  THE BASICS OF COPYRIGHT, PREEMPTION, AND THE EXTRA ELEMENT 
TEST 
A copyright protects the labor and investment a person has put into a 
particular piece of work42 by granting the author “a series of exclusive 
rights.”43 To prevail on a copyright infringement claim, a plaintiff must 
prove: (1) ownership of a valid copyright44 and (2) the infringing party 
copied original elements of the copyrighted work.45 The second 
requirement will be more challenging for the plaintiff to prove than the 
first. Without direct evidence of copying,46 the plaintiff has a heavy 
burden47 to show that his work and the infringing work are “substantially 
similar” in both idea and expression.48 The test of substantial similarity is 
 
 42 Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1145 (9th Cir. 2006). See Fogerty v. Fantasy, 
Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527 (1994) (quoting Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349–
50 (1991)) (clarifying that copyright does not act as an award for the author’s labor, but assures his 
“right to original expression”). 
 43 Buono & Wickers IV, supra note 17, at 5. Section 102 of the Copyright Act grants protection 
to works that are fixed in any tangible medium of expression including (1) literary works, (2) musical 
works, (3) dramatic works, (4) pantomimes and choreographic works, (5) pictorial, graphic, and 
sculptural works, (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works, (7) sound recordings, and (8) 
architectural works. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976). 
Section 106 grants the exclusive right (1) to reproduction of the work, (2) to preparation of derivative 
works based on the copyrighted work, (3) to distribution of the work to the public, (4) to performance 
of the work publicly, and (5) to display of the work publicly. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976). 
Article I, section 8 of the Constitution authorizes Congress to grant rights to authors for the work in 
furtherance of the “Progress of Science and useful Arts.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 44 To register a copyright, one must file an application with the Copyright Office, pay the fee, and 
deposit the required number of copies or phonorecords. ROBERT B. CHICKERING & SUSAN HARTMAN, 
HOW TO REGISTER A COPYRIGHT AND PROTECT YOUR CREATIVE WORK 13 (1980). The copyright 
registration becomes effective on the day when the Copyright Office receives all the materials. Id. 
 45 Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991); see also Sid & Marty Krofft 
Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 1977) (“The real task in a 
copyright infringement action, then, is to determine whether there has been copying . . . .”), superseded 
on other grounds by 17 U.S.C. § 504(b), as recognized in Dream Games of Ariz., Inc. v. PC Onsite, 561 
F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2009).   
 46 See Reyher v. Children’s Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1976) (observing how 
difficult it may be to obtain direct evidence of copying). 
 47 See Muller v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 794 F. Supp. 2d 429, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(deciding for summary judgment in favor of the defendant because the similarities were insubstantial); 
Smith v. Weinstein, 578 F. Supp. 1297, 1302 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (finding dissimilarity because even 
though there were some similarities, they were “too general or too insignificant to be protectable”); 
Buono & Wickers IV, supra note 17, at n.15 (admitting that the court usually finds for the copyright 
defendant on summary judgment) (citing Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1355 (9th Cir. 1990))). 
 48 Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir. 1985); Funky Films, Inc. v. Time Warner 
Entm’t Co., L.P., 462 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc., 562 
F.2d at 1164 (stating that there must be “substantial similarity not only of the general ideas but of the 
expressions of those ideas as well.”), superseded by statute on other grounds, 17 U.S.C. § 504(b); see 
also Reyher, 533 F.2d at 92–93 (“Since both [works] present only the same idea, no infringement as to 
protected expression occurred.”); Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 913 (2d Cir. 1980) 
(“[S]imilarity of idea or function must be distinguished from similarity of artistic expression.”); Fisher-
Price, Inc. v. Well-Made Toy Mfg. Corp., 25 F.3d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1994) (distinguishing between the 
plaintiff’s demonstration of “similarity,” which applies to the entire work, including idea and 
expression, not just the protectable elements, and the plaintiff’s demonstration of “illegality,” meaning 
that the plaintiff proves the defendant took the plaintiff’s means of idea expression, not merely that the 
defendant expressed the same idea); Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1002 (2d Cir. 1995) 
Do Not Delete 4/13/2013 11:21 PM 
444 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 16:2 
“whether the accused work is so similar to the copyrighted work that the 
ordinary reasonable person would conclude that the defendant unlawfully” 
used the plaintiff’s work.49 Even if the similarity is a small part of the entire 
work, substantial similarity can be found if the similarity is “qualitatively” 
important.50 
The courts have applied different tests to guide them in determining 
the adequate level of similarity between two works necessary to meet the 
substantial similarity test.51 For example, the Ninth Circuit test employs a 
 
(discussing the analysis of a work that contains protectable and unprotectable elements requires 
isolating the unprotectable elements and asking “whether the protectable elements, standing alone, are 
substantially similar”). 
The “idea/expression dichotomy” is the distinction between an unprotectable idea and its protectable 
expression. Jonathan S. Caplan, Copyright Infringement—Application of the Originality Requirement 
and the Idea/Expression Merger Doctrine to Compilations of Data—Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 
F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991), 65 TEMP. L. REV. 275, 275–76 (1992). It limits copyright protection in the case 
of facts, principles, and ideas. 2 JAY DRATLER, JR. & STEPHEN M. MCJOHN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LAW: COMMERCIAL, CREATIVE, AND INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY § 5.01[2], at 5–9 (Law Journal Press 
2012). 
 49 See Russel J. Frackman, Litigating Copyright Cases, PLI Order No. G4 –3954, 419 PLI/Pat 7, 
27 (1995); see also Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960) 
(explaining that a casual observer would overlook the differences between a plaintiff and defendant’s 
work unless he actually intended to find the disparities). 
 50 See Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir. 1985); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 
1061, 1071 (2d Cir. 1977) (finding that even though only less than one percent of the copyrighted letters 
were copied, they were relevant); Horgan v. MacMillan, Inc., 789 F.2d 157, 163 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting 
that “[a] snapshot of a single moment . . . may communicate a great deal”). But see Concrete Machinery 
Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 608 (1st Cir. 1988) (stating that copyright 
infringement will not be found only when slight or trivial variations are found between the two works). 
 51 See Frackman, supra note 49, at 28. 
A sample of the tests to define “substantial similarity” include: 
The “abstractions” test: A defendant may take an abstract of the whole copyrighted work.  
Many patterns of generality can fit around a copyrighted work and the number of patterns 
increases as specifics are omitted from the abstract until all that may be left is a title or a 
summary of the work.  
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). A point exists where the 
copyrighted work is no longer protected because the similarity lies in the idea rather than the expression 
of the idea. Id.; see, e.g., Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that 
no substantial similarity existed between a film and a book beyond generalized and nonprotectible ideas 
because they “differ radically in pace and dramatic structure,” even though they both tell the same 
story). 
The “patterns” test: The “pattern” of a work is protected. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law 
of Copyright, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 513–14 (1945). “Pattern” includes the “sequence of events and 
the development of the interplay of characters.” Id. 
“Comprehensive nonliteral similarity” and “fragmented literal similarity”: “Comprehensive nonliteral 
similarity” is a situation where the offending work copies the fundamental essence or structure of 
another work. 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A][1], at 
13-39 (Matthew Bender 2012). See, e.g., Feder v. Videotrip Corp., 697 F. Supp. 1165, 1173 (D. Colo. 
1988) (holding that a videotape and travel guide did not meet the standard because the similarities in 
structure and essence are inherent in other travel guides reviewing similar subjects). The “fragmented 
literal similarity” test entails a situation where pieces of a copyrightable work are taken and used, but 
the fundamental substance of the work is not copied. The test examines when the similarity becomes so 
substantial as to constitute infringement.  4 NIMMER, supra note 51, § 13.03[A][2], at 13-54. The 
question becomes “whether the similarity relates to matter that constitutes a substantial portion of 
plaintiff’s work—not whether such material constitutes a substantial portion of defendant’s work.” Id. at 
13-54.1 (emphasis added). 
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two-step process.52 The first step is an “extrinsic test”53 that examines 
whether the general ideas are substantially similar, using specific criteria, 
such as the type of artwork, the materials, the subject matter, and the 
setting of the story.54 Satisfying this objective test55 can be difficult because 
the analysis depends on the availability and complexity of the evidence.56 If 
the extrinsic test is satisfied and the ideas are substantially similar, the 
analysis progresses to the second step, labeled the “intrinsic test.” This 
focuses on the expression of the idea, such as the final version of a movie 
or the aired version of a television show.57 This test is subjective58 and 
relies on the perceptions, observations, and impressions of an ordinary, 
reasonable person who can respond to the expression.59 Therefore, the 
extrinsic test resolves whether a defendant has taken the actual idea while 
 
The “total concept and feel” test: The degree to which it appears to an observer that the defendant 
captured the total concept and feel of the plaintiff’s copyrighted work. See Roth Greeting Cards v. 
United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970) (finding that the characters in the art work, the 
mood the characters portrayed, the totality of the art work “conveying a particular mood with a 
particular message,” and the word arrangement are substantially similar to the copyrighted work), 
superseded by statute, 17 U.S.C. § 411(a); Warner Bros. Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 654 F.2d 204, 
211 (2d Cir. 1981) (quoting 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 
13.03[E][3], at 13-48 (Matthew Bender rev. ed. 1980)) (finding that the total concept and feel of the two 
works are different because the plaintiff attempts to meet his burden of proof in an analysis that changes 
the “actual sequence or construction” of his work to achieve greater similarity with the defendant’s 
product); Reyher v. Children’s Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 92 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that the 
works are not similar in “total feel” because the copyrighted work develops the characters and the 
allegedly infringing work is void of setting or character development in presenting the theme). 
 52 See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th 
Cir. 1977) (concluding that the requirement of substantial similarity in a copyright infringement claim 
imposes a two-step analytic process), superseded by statute on other grounds, 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(b). 
 53 It is labeled the extrinsic test because the resolution of the test does not depend on a judge or 
jury’s determination but on specific evidence. As such, expert testimony is relevant. Id. 
 54 Id.; see also Jason v. Fonda, 526 F. Supp. 774, 777 (C.D. Cal. 1981) (adding to the list of 
specific expressive elements in a substantial similarity analysis: plot, themes, dialogue, mood, setting, 
pace, characters, and sequence of events); Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(explaining that the substantial similarity test compares “actual concrete elements” that are part of the 
storyline and the major characters, rather than analyzing the similarities between the basic plot ideas). 
 55 Kouf v. Walt Disney Pictures and Television, 16 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 56 See Scott Hervey, The Complexity of Proving Copyright Infringement, WEINTRAUB GENSHLEA 
CHEDIAK: THE IP LAW BLOG, (Feb. 20, 2007), http://www.theiplawblog.com/ 
archives/-copyright-law-the-complexity-of-proving-copyright-infringement.html (opining that the 
extrinsic test focuses on “articulable similarities between protectable elements,” rather than the basic 
plot ideas). 
 57 See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc., 562 F.2d at 1164 (noting that “[i]f there is 
substantial similarity in ideas, then the trier of fact must decide whether there is substantial similarity in 
the expressions of the ideas so as to constitute infringement”).  
 58 See Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that “judicial 
determination under the intrinsic test is now virtually devoid of analysis, for the intrinsic test has 
become a mere subjective judgment as to whether two . . . works are or are not similar.”). 
 59 Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Stonesifer, 140 F.2d 579, 582 (9th Cir. 1944). Since the 
test is a subjective one, the intrinsic test is usually left in the hands of a jury to decide. See Shaw, 929 
F.2d at 1360 (commenting on how the subjective assessment is better suited for the jury than for a judge 
because subjectivity is not a legal conclusion but one that depends on each individual person’s 
interaction with the two pieces of work in dispute); Matthew Joseph, The Unsolicited Screenplay 
Cometh — Copyright infringement claims by unpublished authors, LAW OFFICES OF MATTHEW A. 
JOSEPH, Vol. 2004, No. 4, http://www.josephlaw.com/notes/archives/april04.html (noting that the jury 
is a “proxy” audience). 
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the intrinsic test determines whether the expression of the idea has been 
pilfered.60 Satisfying both the extrinsic test and the intrinsic test constitutes 
copyright infringement.61   
The two-part substantial similarity test demonstrates that copyright 
protection does not extend to ideas alone; the idea must be accompanied 
with an expression of the idea to be eligible for copyright protection.62 Idea 
purveyors,63 such as Larry Montz, who have not yet embodied their ideas in 
an expression before the alleged infringement took place must therefore 
seek recourse through other legal causes of action.64 Copyright preemption 
responds to these alternatives by moderating the relationship between 
federal and state law.65 It ensures that protecting ideas through state law 
causes of action does not interfere with federal copyright law.66 And where 
 
 60 Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc., 562 F.2d at 1165. See Williams v. Crichton, 84 
F.3d 581, 587 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding that if the similarity lays in noncopyrightable elements then there 
is no substantial similarity). 
 61 See Nicholas R. Monlux, An Invitation for Infringement: How the Ninth Circuit’s Extrinsic and 
Intrinsic Similarity Tests Encourage Infringement: An Analysis Using Reece v. Island Treasures Art 
Gallery, 56 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 543, 544 (2008) (noting that the test used in analyzing 
copyright infringement claims is a two-part test). 
 62 See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976) (clarifying that copyright does not cover “any idea, procedure, 
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which 
it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work”); Blakeman v. The Walt Disney Co., 
613 F. Supp. 2d 288, 305 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting Kregos v. Assoc. Press, 3 F.2d 656, 663 (2d Cir. 
1993) (stating that “[t]he law is clear that ‘a copyright does not protect an idea, but only the expression 
of an idea . . .’”)); LITWAK, supra note 10, at 17 (stating that “ideas are not copyrightable because they 
are not considered ‘an expression of an author’”). 
As applied specifically to the Montz case, copyright law does not protect Larry’s Montz’s idea for a 
television show. Muller v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 794 F. Supp. 2d 429, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011). 
Even though the author is not afforded copyright protection for his idea, the producer and author can 
contract to supply such protection. See Minnear v. Tors, 266 Cal. App. 2d 495, 503 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1968) (citing Chandler v. Roach, 319 P.2d 776, 781 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957)) (explaining that even though 
the material is unprotected, the producer and writer are free to make whatever contract they want to 
transact in the exchange of ideas regardless of whether the producer later finds that he could have 
contrived the exact ideas without paying money for them). 
 63 “Idea men” try to market the products of their minds and have a difficult time doing so because 
of their poor bargaining position. Arthur R. Miller, Common Law Protection for Products of the Mind: 
An “Idea” Whose Time Has Come, 119 HARV. L. REV. 703, 708 (2006). The term “idea man” is used in 
scholarship concerning the protection of ideas. Samuel M. Bayard, Note, Chihuahuas, Seventh Circuit 
Judges, and Movie Scripts, Oh My!: Copyright Preemption of Contracts to Protect Ideas, 86 CORNELL 
L. REV. 603, 604 n.5 (2001). 
 64 See Selby v. New Line Cinema Corp., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (quoting 
Stanley v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 221 P.2d 73, 85 (Cal. 1950)) (noting that “[t]he use of ideas 
unprotected by copyright may provide the basis for a breach of contract claim because ‘the policy that 
precludes protection of an abstract idea by copyright does not prevent its protection by contract’”). 
 65 See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 375 (7th ed. 2004) 
(“The Court must consider the federal law and its operation and compare the state statute and its 
operation.”). Preemption is based on the Supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution, requiring that 
federal law override state regulation where there is an actual conflict between the two sets of laws. Id. at 
374. 
 66 See MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 523 (4th ed. 2005) (recognizing 
that the overlap and coexistence between common law copyright and federal copyright laws has created 
tension). 
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a conflict exists, federal law controls.67 A state law claim is preempted if 
two requirements are met: (1) the “subject matter requirement”—the work 
to be protected falls within one of the categories protected by the Copyright 
Act;68 and (2) the “general scope requirement”—the state law claim asserts 
rights (i.e., reproduction, distribution, display, etc.) that are equivalent to 
one of the exclusive rights granted protection under the Copyright Act.69 
This Comment will focus on the second prong of this test as it has been the 
central source of conflict for idea submission cases like that of Larry 
Montz.70 Resolving these cases requires determining whether the asserted 
 
 67 See Christina Bohannan, Copyright Preemption of Contracts, 67 MD. L. REV. 616, 619 (2008) 
(describing how under preemption, courts consider whether a state law claim interferes with the 
purposes of federal law). 
 68  Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 848 (2d Cir. 1997). Copyright 
protection is available to original works of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression. Works 
of authorship include: “(1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; (3) 
dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) 
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound 
recordings; and (8) architectural works.” 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976). Ideas are not included in these 
categories but would still be able to meet the “subject matter” requirement for preemption because 
copyrightable material can contain uncopyrightable elements such as ideas, thereby applying 
preemption to uncopyrightable and copyrightable elements. See Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 105 F.3d at 
849; see also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 1983) 
(noting that even though an original work of authorship contains uncopyrightable elements, the work as 
a whole is not taken outside of preemption). A plaintiff will try to argue against preemption by claiming 
that ideas captured in a body of work do not fall under the Copyright Act because the Act specifically 
denies protection to ideas. See U.S. Ex Rel. Berge v. Trs. of Univ. of Ala., 104 F.3d 1453, 1463 (4th 
Cir. 1997). The umbrella that encompasses what is included in preemption is wider than the umbrella 
encompassing what is protected by the Copyright Act. Id. (holding that “scope and protection are not 
synonyms” and that “the shadow actually cast by the Act’s preemption is notably broader than the wing 
of its protection”); Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 455 (6th Cir. 2001) (focusing on the 
Second, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits that have held subject matter to include not only tangible 
expressions but also elements of expression that are not protected under the Copyright Act). Even 
though ideas are not covered under federal copyright law, they do not automatically fail the subject 
matter requirement. See Murray Hill Publ’ns v. ABC Commc’ns, Inc., 264 F.3d 622, 636 (6th Cir. 
2001) (emphasizing that the expression of an idea is the “essence of the subject matter” of copyright); 
Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 105 F.3d at 849 (noting that uncopyrightable and copyrightable elements of 
state law claims can be preempted); Boyle v. Stephens Inc., No. 97 CIV 1351(SAS), 1998 WL 690816, 
at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 1998) (clarifying that preemption extends beyond copyrightable and protected 
works of authorship and encompasses uncopyrightable elements). 
 69 Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 105 F.3d at 848. See Kabehie v. Zoland, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721, 727 
(Cal.Ct.App. 2002) (stating that if the claim based on a state-protected right is infringed by 
“reproduction, performance, distribution or display,” then it is equivalent to a federal exclusive right) 
(citing 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, §1.01 [B] [1], at 1-12 
(Matthew Bender 2002). 
When violation of a state law is based on an act incorporating elements beyond those of the exclusive 
rights under copyright law, then the rights are not equivalent and the second prong fails. Harper & Row 
Publishers, Inc., 723 F.2d at 200. See also Wrench LLC, 256 F.3d at 455 (“asking whether the state 
common law or statutory action at issue asserts rights that are the same as those protected under § 106 
of the Copyright Act”); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that 
equivalent rights to the exclusive rights granted under the Copyright Act are established in the laws of 
each state). 
 70 Montz v. Pilgrim Films & Television, Inc., 649 F.3d 975, 980 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Nathan 
Smith, Comment, The Shrinkwrap Snafu: Untangling the “Extra Element” in Breach of Contract 
Claims Based on Shrinkwrap Licenses, 2003 BYU L. REV. 1373, 1393 (2003) (observing how courts do 
not “normally struggle” with the subject matter requirement but the equivalency prong is still debated); 
Peter K. Yu, Note, Fictional Persona Test: Copyright Preemption in Human Audiovisual Characters, 
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state claim masks what is truly a copyright claim.71 The courts have 
predominantly utilized the “extra element” test to answer that question.72 
The “extra element” test measures the degree of equivalency between state 
law claims and copyright claims.73 Furthermore, it determines whether 
there is some factor that changes the “nature of the action so that it is 
qualitatively different from a copyright infringement claim,” thereby taking 
the claim outside the bounds of copyright law and avoiding preemption.74 
A copyright holder has the right to reproduce, perform, distribute, and 
display his work.75 Federal copyright infringement occurs when the 
infringer obstructs those rights by reproducing, performing, distributing, or 
displaying the copyright holder’s work.76 At the state level, if an act of 
reproduction, performance, distribution, or display will by itself infringe a 
state-created right on which the plaintiff brings a case, the state claim is 
preempted.77 But if another element is required, instead of, or in addition 
to, reproduction, performance, distribution, or display, to prove the state 
claim, then there is an “extra element.”78 
 
20 CARDOZO L. REV. 355, 370 (1998) (“Although the subject matter prong does not pose much 
difficulty . . . the equivalent right prong is ambiguous.”). 
 71 See Kabehie v. Zoland, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721, 737 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (Mosk, J., concurring) 
(“[T]he ‘fact-specific analysis’ is not easily workable, for it entails an evaluation in each case of the 
nature of the claims”); Scott Faust, NLRB Acting General Counsel Clarifies Duty to Provide 
Information in Bargaining, PROSKAUER (May 18, 2011), 
http://www.laborrelationsupdate.com/nlrb/nlrb-acting-general-counsel-clarifies-duty-to-provide-
information-in-bargaining/ (“[C]ase-specific analysis has led to seemingly inconsistent results . . . .”). 
But see Groubert v. Spyglass Entm’t Group, No. CV 02–01803–SVW, 2002 WL 2031271, at *3 (C.D. 
Cal. 2002) (quoting Fisher v. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d 535, 542 (D. Md. 2000) (recognizing 
that a fact-specific approach was the sensible method to resolve the “general scope requirement” of 
preemption)). 
 72 See Sefton v. Jew, 201 F. Supp. 2d 730, 745 (W.D. Tex. 2001) (citing Alcatel USA, Inc. v. 
DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 787 (5th Cir. 1999)); Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd. 601 F. 
Supp. 1523, 1535 (D.C.N.Y. 1985) (noting that the “extra element” test is the prevailing test). 
 73 See Jay Rubin, Note, Television Formats: Caught in the Abyss of the Idea/Expression 
Dichotomy, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 661, 671 (2006) (stating that when the 
court determines whether a state law claim asserts rights qualitatively different from the rights protected 
under the Copyright Act, it does so under the “extra element” or “equivalency” test). 
 74 Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 1523, 1535 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (emphasis 
added). See Wrench LLC, 256 F.3d 446, 455–456 (6th Cir. 2001) (explaining that the extra element 
operates as an addition or substitute to the acts as defined in the exclusive rights of the Copyright Act, 
which would satisfy the state-created cause of action); Ritchie v. Williams, 395 F.3d 283, 287 n.3 (6th 
Cir. 2005) (noting that most circuits referred to the determination of equivalency as the “extra element 
test”). 
 75 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976). 
 76 See LEAFFER, supra note 66, at 407 (“Copyright infringement occurs when a third party 
violates one or more of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights as enumerated in § 106 of the 1976 
Act.”). 
 77 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 1.01[B][1], at 1-12 
(Matthew Bender 2011) (emphasis added). 
 78 Id. at 1-12 to 1-13 (emphasis added). 
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III.  THE PROBLEM WITH THE “EXTRA ELEMENT” TEST  
The “extra element” test has invoked much criticism79 and attention 
because of its uncertainty80 and lack of guidance.81 The test has been 
criticized for giving the courts too much discretion,82 and inconsistent 
results justify the intense scrutiny.83 This Comment focuses on the “extra 
element” test in breach of implied contract claims.84 Three perspectives 
 
 79 Ritchie, 395 F.3d at 288 n.3. 
 80 See LEAFFER, supra note 66, at 540 (noting that the “extra element” test can’t be applied with 
certainty); see also David B. Sandelands, Advisory, When Does Federal Copyright Law Preempt State 
Contract Law?, ENTERPRISE COUNSEL GROUP (July 24, 2003), 
http://www.enterprisecounsel.com/WhenDoesFederalCopyrightLaw2003.pdf (noting that what exactly 
constitutes an “extra element” is unclear). 
 81 See Joseph P. Bauer, Addressing the Incoherency of the Preemption Provision of the Copyright 
Act of 1976, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 37 (2007) (“[J]udicial application of the [“extra element”] 
test to the large number and variety of claims has given rise to a host of interesting, controversial, 
oftentimes troubling, and, not surprisingly, inconsistent decisions.”). 
 82 See Schulyer M. Moore, Straightening Out Copyright Preemption, 9 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 201, 
204 (2002) (stating that a court that wants to find preemption can do so because there is always a 
difference, no matter how small, between state law and copyright law).  See also Robert W. Clarida & 
Robert J. Bernstein, New York and California Courts Split on Preemption of Idea Claims, N.Y. L.J. 
(July 15, 2011), available at 
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202501070033&New_York_and_Californi
a_Courts_Split_on_Preemption_of_Idea_Claims (“Unless and until [this] Court provides a uniform 
interpretation for federal courts to follow, the outcome of preemption challenges to idea-submission 
claims may  be determined less by the intent of Congress than by the iron law of real estate: location, 
location, location.”); Bayard, supra note 63, at 628 (proposing that Congress might have intended to 
give discretion to courts in determining what state claims should survive preemption); Patrick 
McNamara, Note, Copyright Preemption: Effecting the Analysis Prescribed by Section 301, 24 B.C. L. 
REV., 963, 972 (1983) (stating that judicial interpretation dominated the realm of copyright and 
copyright preemption). 
 83 If a plaintiff brought a breach of implied contract claim based on idea submissions in the 
Second or Fourth Circuit state courts, the court generally found the claim to be preempted. For Second 
Circuit cases, see, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters, 723 F.2d 195, 201 (2d Cir. 
1983) (preempted), rev’d on other grounds, 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Forest Park Pictures v. Universal 
Television Network, 10 Civ. 5168, 2011 WL 1792587, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2011) (preempted), 
vacated, 683 F.3d 424 (2d Cir. 2012); Muller v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 794 F. Supp. 2d 
429, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (preempted); Smith v. New Line Cinema, 03 Civ. 5274, 2004 WL 2049232, 
at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (preempted). For Fourth Circuit cases, see, e.g., Nichols Agency, Inc. v. 
Enchanted Child Care, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d. 774, 783 (D. Md. 2008) (preempted); Madison River 
Mgmt. Co. v. Bus. Mgmt. Software Corp., 351 F. Supp. 2d 436, 445 (M.D. N.C. 2005) (preempted); 
U.S. ex. rel. Berge v. Board of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala., 104 F.3d 1453, 1465 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(preempted); Fischer v. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d 535, 542 (D. Md. 2000) (preempted). 
In the Ninth Circuit, courts found that breach of implied contract claims were not preempted. See, e.g., 
Grosso v. Miramax Film Corp., 383 F.3d. 965, 968 (9th Cir. 2004) (not preempted); Benay v. Warner 
Bros. Entm’t, Inc., 607 F.3d 620 (9th Cir. 2010) (not preempted); Minniear v. Tors, 72 Cal. Rptr. 287 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1968) (not preempted); Firoozye v. Earthlink Network, 153 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1128 
(N.D. Cal. 2001) (not preempted). 
The Sixth Circuit has taken both sides and found some breach of implied contract claims preempted 
while finding others are not preempted. See, e.g., Murray Hill Publ’ns, Inc. v. ABC Commc’ns, Inc., 
264 F.3d 622, 638 (6th Cir. 2001) (preempted), abrogated by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 
S.Ct. 1237 (2010); Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 459 (6th Cir. 2001) (not preempted). 
 84 The analysis will focus on breach of implied-in-fact contracts as opposed to breach of implied-
in-law contracts since implied-in-law contracts are not promises manifested by the intentions of two 
parties. See 4 NIMMER, supra note 51, at 19D-14. Implied-in-law contracts are imposed for reasons of 
justice based on a derived benefit. Id. The implied-in-law contract merely depends on unauthorized use, 
requiring no “extra element” of a promise to pay that would take such a claim outside of preemption. 
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characterize the application of the “extra element” test to breach of contract 
claims: (1) the minority view where breach of contract claims concerning 
reproduction, performance, distribution, or display of a copyrighted work 
are never preempted;85 (2) an alternative view that finds state breach of 
contract actions are always preempted;86 and (3) the majority view where 
breach of contract causes of action are not preempted when they enforce 
rights qualitatively different from those exclusively protected by  copyright 
law.87  
A. Breach of Contract Claims Are Never Preempted 
A few courts have held that a breach of contract case based on 
reproduction, performance, distribution, or display of copyrighted material 
is never preempted. The inherent promise in a contract is the “extra 
element” that sets a contract claim apart from a copyright case.88 
In ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,89 the court emphasized that “[a] 
copyright is a right against the world,” restricting strangers in what they 
can do.90 An equivalent state right would have the power to restrict 
strangers from acting.91 But state rights created by a contract affect only 
their parties, not strangers outside the contract.92 A right enforceable 
against a particular party is not equivalent to a right enforceable against the 
world.93 A contract therefore does not create rights equivalent to the 
exclusive rights granted in federal copyright law because a contract right 
cannot be enforced against strangers to the contract.94 Even though the 
court intends to avoid adopting a blanket statement that every contract 
claim escapes preemption,95 the court’s holding does exactly the opposite. 
It establishes that contract rights are different from rights under copyright 
law in all cases.96 The court’s opinion asks, “[a]re rights created by contract 
 
Wrench LLC, 256 F.3d at 459. 
 85 See infra Part III(A) (discussing the reasoning of a number of courts for finding an extra 
element in every breach of contract cause of action). 
 86 See infra Part III(B) (discussing how a court can presumptively find preemption in all breach 
of contract cases). 
 87 See infra Part III(C) (discussing how a majority of courts are not quick to conclude that every 
breach of contract cause of action is preempted). 
 88 See Sandelands, supra note 80; Aileen Brophy, Whose Idea Is It Anyway? Protecting Idea 
Purveyors and Media Producers After Grosso v. Miramax, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 507, 522 
(2005) (“[C]ontract rights are inherently different from the rights granted by copyright.”). 
 89 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 90 Id. at 1454. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. See also CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 11, at 170 (explaining that a contract requires 
the offeree to exchange a requested performance or promise for the offeror’s promise); JEFFREY 
FERRIELL & MICHAEL NAVIN, UNDERSTANDING CONTRACTS 7 (LexisNexis 2004) (observing how the 
freedom of contract is based on the principle that every individual “is in the best position to know what 
is in his or her own best interest, and should be free to pursue that interest”). 
 93 Brophy, supra note 88, at 522. 
 94 Id. 
 95 See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 96 See Bayard, supra note 82, at 617 (“[T]he opinion’s [(ProCD)] language and logic tell a 
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‘equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of 
copyright‘?” The court answers “no.”97 The court’s answer is absolute and 
without qualification, leaving little possibility for overlap between 
copyright and contract rights.98 The court thus renders the preemption 
mechanism inoperative. 
Academics in the copyright field, such as Professor Paul Goldstein,99 
also support the reasoning portrayed in ProCD. Professor Goldstein takes 
ProCD a step further,100 saying, “contract law is a good example of a state 
law that will be immune from preemption under the extra element test. . . . 
[C]ontract law requires the plaintiff to prove the existence of a bargained-
for exchange—something it need not prove in a cause of action for 
copyright infringement.”101 Just like the court in ProCD, Professor 
Goldstein does not otherwise qualify his statement with exceptions to 
immunity, appearing to infer that contract claims will always be immune.102 
Under this line of reasoning, the “bargained-for exchange” part of every 
contract103 is the “extra element” that allows a breach of contract claim to 
avoid preemption in every case.104 
The danger in following this rationale is that anything labeled 
“contract” will escape preemption.105 This includes contracts, which 
promise to refrain from doing what copyright law already prohibits: 
contracts promising not to reproduce, distribute, perform, or display a 
work.106 Plaintiffs are therefore given a free pass to circumvent federal 
copyright law, pursue a state claim, obtain a remedy under state law, and 
virtually nullify the preemption mechanism.107 It is the court’s duty to 
 
different story, in which it is indeed hard to imagine a contract claim not considered qualitatively 
different.”). 
 97 ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1454. 
 98 Bayard, supra note 82, at 617. 
 99 Professor Paul Goldstein is a recognized scholar in the field of intellectual property law and 
has authored a volume of books about the field including a treatise on copyright law, a casebook, and a 
number of other books. Paul Goldstein, Stella W. and Ira S. Lillick Professor of Law, STANFORD LAW 
SCHOOL DIRECTORY, http://www.law.stanford.edu/node/166390 (last visited Jan. 6, 2012). 
 100 See Kabehie v. Zoland, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721, 737 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (Mosk, J., concurring) 
(“Professor Paul Goldstein, in his highly-regarded work on copyright, presents an even broader concept 
of the contract exemption from federal copyright preemption.”). 
 101 Id. (quoting 3 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT §15.2.1, at 15:12 (2d ed. 2002 supp.)). 
 102 See id.  
 103 See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 11, at 170 (explaining that consideration is generally 
required in agreements and then describing that consideration is “bargained for by the promisor, and 
exchanged by the promisee in return for the promisor’s promise”). 
 104 See Kabehie, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 737 (Mosk, J., concurring). 
 105 See 1 NIMMER, supra note 77, at 1–23 (footnotes omitted) (“[P]re-emption should continue to 
strike down claims that, though denominated ‘contract,’ nonetheless complain directly about the 
reproduction of expressive materials.”); LEAFFER, supra note 66, at 539 (stating that ProCD takes an 
extreme view of “freedom of contract,” allowing no contract to be preempted). 
 106 See Kabehie v. Zoland, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721, 732 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); see also Wrench LLC 
v. Taco Bell Corp. 256 F.3d 446, 457 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Under [the] rationale, a contract which consisted 
only of a promise not to reproduce the copyrighted work would survive preemption even though it was 
limited to one of the exclusive rights enumerated in 17 U.S.C. § 106.”). 
 107 See Kabehie, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 732; see also Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 
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avoid drawing a quick conclusion from the pleaded “laundry list” of 
elements in state law claims and to analyze whether an “extra element” 
truly exists.108 
B. Breach of Contract Claims Are Always Preempted 
At least one court has found that breach of contract claims are always 
preempted by federal copyright law, and another court came very close to 
reaching that conclusion.109 
In Wolff v. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.,110 a 
photographer sued an engineering society for exceeding the rights that the 
photographer originally granted to the society for use of a photograph.111 
The court held that copyright law preempted the plaintiff’s state law claim 
for breach of contract,112 relying heavily on congressional intent and 
Congress’s actions when enacting the preemption provision of the 
Copyright Act.113  
The current preemption section of the Copyright Act describes 
preempted claims in a generalized way.114 However, the House of 
Representatives Committee Report to the Copyright Act illustrates that an 
earlier draft of the preemption provision explicitly listed specific causes of 
actions that would not be preempted, including breach of contract.115 That 
portion of the Act was eliminated on the floor of the House and does not 
 
1550 (11th Cir. 1996) (observing how a plaintiff can dress up a copyright infringement claim with a 
state law claim by “artful pleading and presentation of evidence”); LEAFFER, supra note 66, at 539 
(observing that the balance copyright law strikes is at risk). 
 108 Idema v. Dreamworks, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1190 (C.D. Cal. 2001); see ProCD v. 
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding courts should not presumptively conclude that 
anything labeled as “contract” avoids preemption); Wrench LLC, 256 F.3d at 457 (distinguishing that 
even though some state contract claims avoid preemption does not mean that all state contract actions 
do the same simply because they have the additional element of a promise); Endemol Entm’t B.V. v. 
Twentieth Television, Inc., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d 1524, 1528 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (stating that the promise not to 
benefit from a copyrighted work, without more, is an insufficient “extra element”); Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari at *14, Miramax Film Corp. v. Grosso, 383 F.3d 965 (2004) (No. 04–1682), 2005 WL 
1403156 at 3 (observing the necessity of courts to look beyond the label and the conclusory allegations 
of a state law cause of action). 
 109 See Kabehie, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 731 n.6 (stating that several authorities have ascribed this 
classification to a case). 
 110 768 F. Supp. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 111 See id. at 67 (showing that the invoice containing the conditions of use had a “time limit on 
use,” but the defendant went on to use the photograph beyond the time limit without the plaintiff’s 
consent). 
 112 Id. at 69. 
 113 Id.; see also Architectronics, Inc. v. Control Sys., 935 F. Supp. 425, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) 
(explaining that Wolff rests almost entirely on legislative history). 
 114 Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd. 601 F. Supp. 1533, 1535 (D.C.N.Y. 1985). 
 115 See H.R. Rep. No. 94–1476, at 132 (1976) (“Nothing in the bill derogates from the rights of 
parties to contract with each other and to sue for breaches of contract . . . .”). The preemption statute 
allows the pursuit of claims under state law including: “misappropriation . . . breaches of contract, 
breaches of trust, trespass, conversion, invasion of privacy, defamation, and deceptive trade practices.” 
Id. at 24. 
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appear in the final version of the Copyright Act.116 The removal arguably 
illustrates that Congress intended those causes of action to be preempted.117  
The Wolff court, in fact, inferred “[w]here Congress includes limiting 
language in an earlier version of a bill, but deletes it prior to enactment, it 
may be presumed that the limitation was not intended.”118 The court 
interpreted Congress’ deletion of the provision protecting breach of 
contract claims from preemption to mean that such claims should always be 
preempted.119 
But subsequent courts have indicated that Wolff goes too far in 
interpreting congressional intent.120 One possible explanation that has been 
offered for Congress’ action is that House members were concerned that an 
explicit list would cause confusion about the scope of preemption, 
especially since the list was non-exhaustive.121 The purported danger was 
that clearly identifying non-preempted rights would give states a green 
light to pass laws concerning those rights, thereby rendering preemption 
useless.122 The bill was therefore revised to account for the possibility of 
ambiguity and to maintain the power of preemption.123 
The courts have been reluctant to follow Wolff’s dispositive 
determination of congressional intent derived from the omission of 
examples of non-preempted rights from the final version of the Copyright 
Act.124 Rather, courts have regarded Wolff as standing for the proposition 
 
 116 17 U.S.C. § 301. 
 117 Russello v. U.S., 464 U.S. 16, 21 (1983) 
 118 Wolff, 768 F. Supp. at 69  (citing Russello v. U.S., 464 U.S. 16, 21 (1983)). 
 119 See id. at 69; see also Architectronics, Inc., 935 F. Supp. at 440 (noting that the Wolff court 
held all contract claims preempted without considering whether a promise could ever be the “extra 
element” to take a state claim outside of preemption). 
 120 See Architectronics, Inc., 935 F. Supp. at 441 (“However, there is nothing in the legislative 
history or elsewhere to suggest that this was the motive behind the deletion.”); LEAFFER, supra note 66, 
at 535 (noting that the legislative history in this particular situation is too ambiguous to provide any 
insight to determine whether a right is equivalent); 1 NIMMER, supra note 77, at 1–16 (indicating that 
the Wolff court’s logic was faulty because under that logic, it could be argued that the originally 
enumerated claims would be deemed non-preempted but then the non-enumerated causes of action 
could be held to be preempted). 
 121 See Nat’l Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l., Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 433 (8th Cir. 
1993) (explaining how congressional members were concerned about the tort of misappropriation that 
was added to the list of the examples and thus decided to do away with the list altogether to avoid 
confusion). 
 122 Id. at 434 n.5 (stating that the inclusion of a specific example of a non-preempted cause of 
action like misappropriation could be interpreted by the courts as authorizing states to pass 
misappropriation laws). 
 123 Id. (noting a concern presented by a representative that the inclusion of “misappropriation” 
would inadvertently nullify the preemption section of the Copyright Act because its inclusion would 
indicate to courts that the states are authorized to pass misappropriation laws and such laws would 
render preemption meaningless). The main concern with “misappropriation” sounded a death knell for 
the entire list altogether. Id. (stating that the amendment to strike the examples list was “merely to 
remove the specific reference to misappropriation”). 
 124 See Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 1523, 1533 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (“[I]t 
seems that no inference as to Congress’s intent may be drawn from the fact that the illustrative list was 
dropped from the statute as it was finally enacted.”). 
Do Not Delete 4/13/2013 11:21 PM 
454 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 16:2 
that a breach of contract claim is preempted when a plaintiff alleges that 
copyright infringement caused the breach of contract.125 
The case of Endemol Entertainment B.V. v. Twentieth Television, 
Inc.,126 came dangerously close to articulating a categorical rule similar to 
Wolff: a breach of an implied contract, in particular, is always preempted.127 
The plaintiff in this case hoped to license his television program concept 
and format.128 The defendant expressed an interest in the concept and 
format.129 During negotiations, both parties understood that the plaintiff 
would be paid for any use of his ideas.130 The defendant started to market 
the television series without the plaintiff’s permission.131 The plaintiff and 
defendant later broke off negotiations when no agreement could be 
reached.132 The defendant then produced a pilot based on the format and 
concept of the plaintiff’s program.133 The court found that the plaintiff’s 
claim alleged no rights beyond the defendant’s promise not to benefit from 
the plaintiff’s copyrighted work, which did not rise to the level of an “extra 
element.”134 The promise not to benefit was not an “extra element” because 
copyright law already protects a copyright holder from an infringer who 
benefits from the work.135 The defendant in this case received the benefit of 
the plaintiff’s work.136 Copyright law alone could effectively protect the 
plaintiff’s rights and therefore preempted the breach of contract claim.137  
Citing Professor Nimmer for the proposition that “quasi-contracts” are 
preempted, the Endemol court concluded that implied contracts are a 
species of quasi-contracts and should therefore be preempted in all cases.138 
A number of courts have followed the same line of thought.139 However, 
 
 125 Nat’l Car Rental Sys., Inc., 991 F.2d at 431. 
 126 48 U.S.P.Q.2d 1524 (C.D. Cal. 1998). 
 127 See id. at 1528 (stating that an implied contract is an exception to the assertion that contract 
claims are not preempted). One of the concerns expressed by those who support preemption of implied-
in-fact contract claims is that the Copyright Act will become obsolete as the states’ power grows. See 
Daboub v. Gibbons, 42 F.3d 285, 290 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating that “if the language of the act could be so 
easily circumvented, the preemption provision [of the Copyright Act] would be useless, and the policies 
behind a uniform Copyright statute would be silenced.”); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 
1455 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting how states will interfere with the national objectives and regulatory 
systems of the national government). 
 128 Endemol Entertainment B.V., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d, at 1525. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. at 1528. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. 
 137 See id. (“Plaintiff’s claim asserts no violation of rights separate from those copyright law was 
designed to protect and, consequently, is preempted by federal law.”). 
 138 See id. at 1528 (quoting 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 
§ 1.01[B][1][a], [g] at 1-19, 1-34 (Matthew Bender 1997) (“‘[C]ontract causes of action themselves are 
not typically pre-empted,’ but . . . implied contracts as a species of quasi contract ‘should be regarded as 
an equivalent right and pre-empted insofar as it applies to copyright subject matter.’”). 
 139 See, e.g., Chesler/Perlmutter Prods., Inc. v. Fireworks Entm’t, 177 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1059 
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courts have mistakenly interpreted Professor Nimmer’s work because a 
“quasi-contract” is merely a type of implied contract rather than a term 
incorporating all implied contracts. A “quasi-contract” is an implied-in-law 
contract, as opposed to an implied-in-fact contract.140 The focus of cases 
like Endemol has been the implied-in-fact contract where the parties’ 
actions reflect a mutual understanding of a promise to pay for the use of 
ideas.141 The “quasi-contract” has little value in analyzing situations where 
implied-in-fact contracts are in dispute. Professor Nimmer addresses the 
distinction: “[Q]uasi-contract refers to an obligation imposed by law to 
avoid unjust enrichment. It is therefore . . . pre-empted . . . . Unfortunately, 
courts often refer to ‘implied-in-fact’ contracts as pre-empted, when they 
mean to declare implied-in-law (i.e., quasi-) contract[s]” as preempted.142 
Professor Nimmer further clarifies that “implied-in-fact” contracts survive 
preemption.143 As a result, the Endemol court’s analysis became misguided 
when it introduced quasi-contract theories to its preemption analysis of an 
implied-in-fact contract.  
The critical difference between an implied-in-fact contract and an 
implied-in-law contract is the existence of an “extra element.”144 The “extra 
element” in an implied-in-fact contract claim is the promise to pay, while 
an implied-in-law contract does not require an “extra element” beyond 
reproduction, performance, distribution or display.145 The former typically 
avoids preemption and the latter results in preemption of state claims. 
Therefore, the interchangeable use of the term “implied contract” in 
reference to both an “implied-in-fact” contract and an “implied-in-law” 
 
(C.D. Cal. 2001) (“Implied contracts are more often found to be preempted.”); Fischer v. Viacom Int’l 
Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d 535, 541 (D. Md. 2000) (noting that a majority of courts have found implied 
contracts preempted by the Copyright Act); Worth v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 816, 822 
(C.D. Cal. 1997) (holding that the plaintiff’s breach of implied contract based on meetings and 
discussions to market a film screenplay was preempted because the implied contract was a species of 
quasi contract). 
 140 See Ferriell & Navin, supra note 92, at 9–10 (stating that a contract implied in law is 
sometimes called a “quasi-contract”). 
 141 See Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 592, 597 (1923) (describing an “implied 
in fact” agreement as inferred from the conduct of the parties showing their mutual understanding and 
meeting of the minds and an “implied in law” agreement as imposed by the fiction of law to perform a 
legal duty). 
 142 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 19D.03[C][2], at 19D-
33 (Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2011) (footnotes omitted). 
 143 See id. at 19D-33 n.71. 
 144 Celestial Mechanix, Inc. v. Susquehanna Radio Corp., No. CV 03-5834-GHK, 2005 WL 
4715213, at *7 (C.D. Cal. 2005). 
 145 Id., see also Firoozye v. Earthlink Network, 153 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1127 (N.D. Cal. 2001) 
(“[A] plaintiff seeking to establish that a defendant breached an implied-in-fact contract would also 
have to prove elements beyond unauthorized use, including that the defendant made an enforceable 
promise to pay and breached that promise.”); LORD, supra note 17, at 41 (commenting on how language 
is susceptible to vagueness so that the same words could be used to convey different meanings). 
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contract can distort the preemption analysis.146 Courts and commentators 
must be careful to keep the two distinctly separate.147 
Rather than conducting an intensive analysis of the facts, the Wolff 
and Endemol courts adhered to the view that breach of contract claims are 
always preempted by federal copyright law. A fact-heavy analysis of the 
rights that each plaintiff claimed may have yielded different results and 
offered guidance to courts navigating similar claims. 
C. Breach of Contract Claims Are Not Preempted When They Enforce 
Rights Qualitatively Different From the Exclusive Rights of 
Copyright Law 
Many courts have gravitated away from adopting a bright-line rule 
and towards a fact-specific analysis to determine whether a breach of 
contract claim protects rights that are qualitatively different from rights 
under copyright law.148 Courts are valuing substance over form so that 
plaintiffs can no longer disguise a federal copyright claim as a state law 
claim.149 
In Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp.,150 Taco Bell expressed an interest 
in using a “Psycho Chihuahua” cartoon from a licensing trade show.151 In 
later discussions with Taco Bell, one of the cartoon creators suggested 
using a live dog that would be given personality through computer 
imaging.152 The two parties discussed how much it would cost to use the 
“Psycho Chihuahua” character and Taco Bell understood that if it chose to 
use the Psycho Chihuahua concept, it would have to pay the cartoonists.153 
The creators’ licensing agency sent a proposal to Taco Bell, laying out the 
fees.154 Taco Bell did not accept the proposal nor did Taco Bell explicitly 
reject it or indicate that it would stop any further discussions.155 The 
cartoonists then gave a formal presentation to Taco Bell’s marketing 
department where they submitted prospective promotional materials 
focused on the “Psycho Chihuahua” and orally conveyed specific ideas for 
 
 146 See Maglica v. Maglica, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 109 n.14 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (noting that the 
difference between an implied-in-fact contract and an implied-in-law contract is “fuzzy”). 
 147 See LORD, supra note 17, at 41 (noting how the use of “implied contract” causes great 
confusion in cases and among lawyers). 
 148 See Anschell et al., supra note 14, at 24; see also Murray Hill Publ’ns, Inc. v. ABC Comm’ns, 
Inc., 264 F.3d 622, 636 (6th Cir. 2001) (emphasizing that a preemption analysis is dependent largely on 
the facts and the claims presented by each of the parties); Chesler/Perlmutter Prods., Inc. v. Fireworks 
Ent’mt, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (noting that a copyright preemption analysis 
is a “claim-by-claim inquiry”); Fischer v. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d 535, 542 (D. Md. 2000) 
(finding that a “categorical rule for preemption of implied-in-fact contracts would be inappropriate”). 
 149 Anschell, supra note 14, at 24. 
 150 256 F.3d 446 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 151 Id. at 449. 
 152 Id. at 450. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. 
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television commercials.156 Taco Bell later hired a different advertising 
agency and sent the hired agency all of the “Psycho Chihuahua” materials 
from Taco Bell’s advertising department.157 Taco Bell later aired a 
Chihuahua commercial and based its marketing efforts around a Chihuahua 
without compensating the designers of “Psycho Chihuahua.”158 
The Wrench court found that the “extra element” in the state law 
breach of implied contract claim was the promise to pay.159 The court 
examined the action that violated the implied contract and concluded that 
the violating act was not one of reproduction, performance, distribution or 
display by itself, but of the failure to pay.160 A copyright holder retains 
rights of reproduction, performance, distribution, or display,161 but 
noticeably absent from this list is the right to payment.162 Failing to pay 
does not violate federal copyright law.163 Therefore, the court held that 
together, the use of the work (which could infringe on copyright) and the 
failure to pay violated the contract.164 However, the use of the work alone 
could not violate the contract.165  
The court emphasized that the qualitative difference from a copyright 
infringement claim arose from the required elements to prove the state 
breach of contract claim: an enforceable promise, a breach, proof of mutual 
assent, consideration, the value of the work, and the defendant’s use of the 
work.166 It was significant, therefore, that the elements necessary to prove 
 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. at 451. The materials most likely consisted of art boards the creators put together; Psycho 
Chihuahua shirts, hats, and stickers for promotional purposes; materials the designers’ newly-hired 
licensing agent sent to the employee for presentation to Taco Bell’s outside advertising agency, which 
described the Chihuahua as “irreverent,” edgy,” and “spicy,” with a craving for Taco Bell food; the 
ideas and examples from a Taco Bell marketing department meeting; and samples of uniform designs, 
shirts, food wrappers, posters, and cup designs based on the proposed ideas at the marketing meeting. 
Id. at 450–51. 
 158 Id. at 451. During the Taco Bell marketing meeting, the creators came up with the idea for a 
television commercial where a male dog would pass up a female dog to get to Taco Bell food. Id. at 
450. The new advertising agency claimed that it came up with the idea for the broadcasted Taco Bell 
commercial, where a male Chihuahua passes a female Chihuahua to get to a person eating Taco Bell 
food, while two of the creative directors were eating Mexican food at a café and saw a Chihuahua 
walking down the street “on a mission.” Id. at 451. Thus, Taco Bell used the independent creation 
defense to show that it came up with the commercial independently from the creators of the “Psycho 
Chihuahua.” Id. at 459. 
 159 Id. at 456. 
 160 Id. 
 161 See 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
 162 Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 456 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 163 See id. (“[T]he state law right is not abridged by an act which in and of itself would infringe 
one of the exclusive rights granted by § 106, since the right to be paid for the use of the work is not one 
of those rights.”). 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. (“It is not the use of the work alone but the failure to pay for it that violates the contract and 
gives rise to the right to recover damages.”). 
 166 Id. 
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the state breach of implied contract were distinct from the elements of a 
copyright infringement claim.167 
The court also looked at the different remedies available through the 
state law claim versus a copyright claim to find a qualitative difference.168 
The court took note of the fact that breach of implied contract actions in the 
state allowed for recovery of the reasonable value of services rendered.169 
The remedies for a copyright infringement action, on the other hand, 
include injunctions,170 impounding and destruction of infringing articles,171 
damages and profits,172 and costs and attorney’s fees.173 For the plaintiffs to 
receive the remedy of reasonable value of services rendered, they had to 
sue under a breach of contract claim.174 In Wrench, the reasonable value of 
services rendered would most likely consist of the time spent to develop, 
(1) the promotional materials submitted to Taco Bell’s advertising 
department, and (2) the ideas that were designed to appeal to the Taco Bell 
marketing team.175 The creators undertook their work with the expectation 
that they would be paid.176 Therefore, the remedies under the state law 
 
 167 See Bohannan, supra note 67, at 625 (explaining how the elements in state law claims are not 
ostensibly identical to the elements of a copyright infringement claim); see also Chandler v. Roach, 319 
P.2d 776, 780 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957) (stating that the elements of an implied-in-fact contract are mutual 
assent and consideration); Architectronics, Inc. v. Control Sys., Inc., 935 F. Supp. 425, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996) (stating that protection for a breach of contract is not the same as copyright protection). 
 168 See Wrench LLC, 256 F.3d 446, 456 (6th Cir. 2001). But see 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID 
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[B][1], at 1-12 (Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2011) (footnote 
omitted) (“Even if additional remedies might exist under state law, the claim is pre-empted absent a 
showing of different rights.”); Nat’l Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l., Inc., 991 F.2d 
426, 435 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that the state law cause of action cannot be preempted merely because 
the remedy for the breach of contract is identical to a remedy in copyright). 
 169 Wrench LLC, 256 F.3d at 456. 
 170 See 17 U.S.C. § 502 (2006) (stating that a court can grant a temporary or final injunction to 
prevent or restrain copyright infringement). 
 171 See 17 U.S.C. § 503 (2006) (stating that a court can impound the copies made or used as part 
of the copyright infringement as well as the means used to produce the copies, and a court can order the 
destruction of the copies and means used in copyright infringement); see also 17 U.S.C. § 503 (2006), 
House Report no. 94-1476, Historical and Revision Notes (“[T]he court could order the infringing 
articles sold, delivered to the plaintiff, or disposed of in some other way that would avoid needless 
waste and best serve the ends of justice.”). 
 172 See 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2006) (stating that a copyright infringer is liable for (1) actual damages 
and any additional profits, or (2) statutory damages). 
In the case of actual damages, the copyright owner just has to prove the infringer’s gross revenue. See 
17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2006). The copyright owner can elect to take actual damages or statutory damages. 
Id. The damages are granted to make the copyright owner whole from the losses suffered by 
infringement, and profits are given to prevent the infringer from wrongfully benefitting from his 
actions. 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2006), House Report no. 94-1476, Historical and Revision Notes. 
 173 See 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2006). 
 174 The payment of reasonable value of services rendered is a remedy available for breach of 
implied contracts. Young v. Young, 191 P.3d 1258, 1268 (Wash. 2008). 
 175 “Reasonable value” is what the other party “received in terms of what it would have cost him 
to obtain it from a person in the claimant’s position.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 371 
(1981). It is usually based on market value. Id. at cmt. a. 
 176 See Cascaden v. Magryta, 225 N.W. 511, 511–12 (Mich. 1929) (holding that the plaintiffs 
could not recover under an implied-in-fact contract because the work was not done, which would have 
allowed the plaintiffs to form an expectation of payment from the defendants). 
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claim made it qualitatively different from a copyright infringement 
claim.177 
The Wrench court did not adhere to a bright-line rule to resolve the 
preemption issue, but instead, went through a step-by-step analysis of the 
infringing action, the elements of proof, and the available remedies to 
conclude that the claim was qualitatively different as to avoid 
preemption.178 
Fischer v. Viacom International, Inc.179 also follows the fact-specific 
approach by looking at the particular rights at issue to determine if the 
claim is preempted.180 The plaintiff in Fischer developed an animated 
character team of “a guy named ‘Steve’ and his blue dog named 
‘Bluey.’”181 He drafted a written proposal for an animated television series 
based on the character team and submitted it to Nickelodeon U.K.182 
Nickelodeon asked for permission from the plaintiff to allow Viacom, 
Nickelodeon’s parent company, to keep “the details of the series on file for 
future reference.”183 The plaintiff responded by sending a more detailed 
description, a script for a pilot of the animated show, a sheet that displayed 
the characters in different poses, and character descriptions.184 The plaintiff 
and Viacom continued their exchanges, and Viacom purportedly expressed 
interest in the character team and encouraged the plaintiff to continue 
developing it.185 The plaintiff was then told to “pursue the production of his 
series” and he was given people to contact.186 Based on this 
encouragement, the plaintiff produced a five-minute video and sent it to 
Nickelodeon.187 The plaintiff was then sent a release to sign,188 whereupon 
he broke off all contact with Nickelodeon so that he could retain the rights 
to his work.189 Nickelodeon never returned any of the plaintiff’s 
materials.190 The plaintiff subsequently discovered a show similar in design 
 
 177 See Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 456 (6th Cir. 2001) (concluding that the 
qualitative difference is reflected in the different remedy granted under a state law claim). But see Am. 
Movie Classics Co. v. Turner Entm’t Co., 922 F. Supp. 926, 932 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting that there 
is “no authority for the novel proposition that a ‘qualitative difference’ between the state law claim and 
the copyright claim may be supplied by a difference in damages claimed for the same basic wrong”). 
 178 See Steven T. Lowe, Preemptive Strike, 26 L.A. LAW 37, 38 (2003) (“The majority of federal 
and state courts that have addressed preemption defenses to breach of contract claims have required a 
fact-specific analysis that inquires whether the promise underlying the contract is essentially nothing 
more than a promise not to violate federal copyright law.”). 
 179 115 F. Supp. 2d 535 (D. Md. 2000). 
 180 See id. at 542 (stating that the better approach is to look at the contractual rights to determine 
equivalency). 
 181 Id. at 537. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. 
 184 Id. at 537–38. 
 185 Id. 
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. 
 188 See supra notes 30–36 and accompanying text (discussing releases). 
 189 Fisher, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 538. 
 190 Id. 
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to his animated character team of Steve and Bluey had aired on 
Nickelodeon.191 
Similar to Wrench, the Fischer court examined the payment right 
created by the implied contract and the plaintiff’s expectation of payment if 
his idea was used.192 However, unlike Wrench, the court found that the 
rights in the implied contract were equivalent to the rights under copyright 
law, focusing on the implied contract’s role as a tool to restrict use by 
someone other than the plaintiff.193 The court appeared to not place too 
much emphasis on “payment,” as it regarded the contract as pure regulation 
of “use” rather than regulation of payment.194 
Similarly, in Selby v. New Line Cinema Corp.,195 the court scrutinized 
the nature of the plaintiff’s allegations to conclude that copyright law 
preempted the implied-in-fact contract claim.196 The plaintiff alleged that 
the defendant agreed to pay him and give him screen credit if his ideas 
were used to produce and distribute a film.197 The plaintiff had submitted 
his screenplay for a movie entitled “Doubletime” to New Line Cinema, 
whereupon “New Line informed [him] that it had recently produced a 
‘time-travel’ film and ‘it was therefore reluctant to produce another film 
that employed transitions in time as a central element.’”198 New Line 
sustained a relationship with the plaintiff by requesting any future drafts of 
“Doubletime,”199 and New Line later purchased a screenplay entitled 
“Frequency” with the same premise.200 The court found that any restriction 
on use of the plaintiff’s ideas strictly fell within the Copyright Act.201 The 
court believed that the plaintiff alleged no additional rights beyond the right 
to use his own work as he pleased.202 The implied contract, as framed by 
the court, did not control conduct beyond the use of the plaintiff’s ideas.203 
The court overlooked the plaintiff’s demand for compensation, finding that 
the right to use the plaintiff’s idea was equivalent to the rights granted 
under federal copyright law and therefore preempted.204 
The court in Idema v. Dreamworks205 also emphasized the 
appropriateness of a fact-specific analysis, focusing on the actual 
 
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. at 542. 
 193 Id. 
 194 Id. 
 195 96 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2000). 
 196 Id. at 1061–62. 
 197 Id. at 1061. 
 198 Id. at 1055. 
 199 See id. 
 200 Id. 
 201 Id. at 1061–62. 
 202 See id. 
 203 Id. at 1062. 
 204 Id. 
 205 162 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (C.D. Cal. 2001). 
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allegations at issue and the “gravamen” of the state law claim.206 The 
plaintiff’s claim for breach of implied contract was based on the studio’s 
understanding that the plaintiff’s story could only be used if the plaintiff 
was paid and on the studio’s knowledge that the plaintiff already prepared 
book and movie proposals.207 Unlike Selby and Fischer, the court 
concluded that the “extra element” was the exchange of promises, relying 
on more than acts of reproduction, copying, distribution, or performance.208 
It is apparent from the varied applications of the “extra element” test 
that the courts’ conclusions were primarily shaped by how they framed 
their analyses and how they chose to perceive the allegations—focusing on 
prohibiting use or focusing on compensation.209 Even the Idema court 
recognized that it could have held the breach of contract claim preempted, 
stating:  
Though it is certainly possible that this claim is preempted, in whole, or in part, 
by the Copyright Act, that preemption is not clear to this Court (a subsequent 
state court is certainly empowered, with greater elucidation of the factual 
allegations underpinning the claim, to make its own findings about preemption 
under copyright).210 
A fact-specific analysis, therefore, will yield different results.211 As 
depicted above, similar factual situations have led to conflicting findings, 
yet the courts have not established a consistent, factually-based method to 
determine whether there is an “extra element.” The division among the 
circuits will further deepen as courts commit to applying their own tests 
and theories to copyright preemption cases.212 The uncertainty in the court 
system trickles down to impact business operations as writers, producers, 
and studios become apprehensive of their legal rights.213 A coherent 
procedure to analyze state law claims for an “extra element” is necessary to 
sustain the flow of everyday business and to guide the courts in their 
decision-making.214 
 
 206 See id. at 1190 (describing how the court looks at the asserted state law claims in comparison 
to a federal copyright claim). 
 207 Id. at 1172–73. 
 208 Id. at 1191. 
 209 See Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2085 (2000) (“[T]he 
Supreme Court’s numerous preemption cases follow no predictable jurisprudential or analytical 
pattern.”). 
 210 Idema, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 1195 
 211 See Dinh, supra note 209, at 2085 (observing that the nature of the preemption analysis partly 
explains the indeterminancy of court decisions). 
 212 Pilgrim Films & Television, Inc. v. Montz, No. 11–143, 2011 WL 3380764, at *11 (U.S. Aug. 
2, 2011) (noting that the court’s holding that the breach of contract claim was not equivalent to any of 
the rights under copyright law would further deepen a longstanding circuit split). 
 213 Brophy, supra note 88, at 515. 
 214 Circuit Split Warrants Review of Copyright Act Preemption, TV Studios Say, 20 MEALEY’S 
LITIG. REP. INTELL. PROP. 25 (2011) (noting that nationwide copyright uniformity is important). 
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IV.  SELBY CHARTS THE PATH FOR A DEFINITIVE APPLICATION OF THE 
“EXTRA ELEMENT” TEST 
The significance of Selby is not its holding, but its review of the 
ProCD decision, which, as explained in Part IIIA, articulated that breach of 
contract claims are never preempted.215 The Selby court essentially 
criticized the characterization of a promise to pay as an “extra element” in 
the preemption analysis.216 The Selby court stated, “the very promise is so 
inextricably entwined with the copyright that to permit the promisee to sue 
upon it would undermine the preemption feature of the Copyright Act.”217 
In other words, allowing a copyright holder to pursue a breach of contract 
claim would weaken the power of copyright preemption because payment 
for the benefit of a copyrighted work is already embodied in the rights 
granted to a copyright holder and thus governed by copyright law. The 
Selby court does not go so far to say that a payment promise preempts a 
breach of contract claim in every case, but only that under the particular 
facts of Selby, the promise was woven into the screenplay owner’s 
copyright. The Selby court’s use of the words “inextricably entwined” 
shapes this Comment’s proposal for a better copyright preemption system 
based on the facts of any given case. 
A. Connecting “Inextricably Entwined” to Constitutional Law 
Similar to the way that Selby’s use of the term draws attention, the 
Supreme Court heavily relied on the term “entwine” in a notable decision. 
In Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic 
Association,218 the phrase “pervasive entwinement” was coined as a way to 
determine if state action existed when a constitutional question was brought 
before a court. State action is any action that is taken by the government, or 
on behalf of the government, especially in the context of constitutional 
law.219 The “pervasive entwinement” test evaluated whether the conduct of 
a private actor, such as an individual or business, was so closely tied to the 
state as to attribute the private actor’s conduct to that of the state.220 If the 
private actor’s conduct was so pervasively entwined with the state, then 
state action existed and the private actor is deemed to have essentially acted 
 
 215 See Selby v. New Line Cinema Corp., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1059 (C.D. Cal. 2000). 
 216 Id. at 1060. See supra notes 107–109 and accompanying text (discussing the dangers with 
following the courts and commentators who find that breach of contract claims are never preempted). 
 217 Selby, 96 F. Supp. 2d at 1060 (emphasis added). The hypothetical that the Selby court lays out 
is: “Suppose, e.g., that the defendant promised ‘I will not infringe any copyright or copyright protection 
in the script you are proposing to show me.’” Id. The promise is one to follow federal copyright law. 
 218 531 U.S. 288 (2001). 
 219 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1538 (9th ed. 2009). 
 220 See Dionne L. Koller, Frozen in Time: The State Action Doctrine’s Application to Amateur 
Sports, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 183, 186 (2008); see also Lisa Mastrogiovanni, Case Note, Brentwood 
Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary School Athletic Ass’n, 121 S. Ct. 924 (2001), 12 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 
711, 713 (2002) (stating that the Supreme Court implemented a new method to find state action). 
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as the state.221 Significantly, the test analyzed when one type of action 
resembled another action in such a striking way that one took on the 
character and identity of the other.222 Even though the Supreme Court did 
not specifically define “entwinement,”223 it illustrated what entwinement 
looks like in a heavily fact-centered inquiry.224  
The defendant in the case was Tennessee Secondary School Athletic 
Association (the “Association”), a membership organization set up to 
regulate interscholastic sports among public and private schools in 
Tennessee.225 The plaintiff was Brentwood Academy, a private school and 
a member of the Association.226 Brentwood Academy challenged a rule 
prohibiting the use of undue influence in recruiting athletes,227 claiming 
that the Association’s enforcement of the rule constituted state action.228 
The Court focused on the organization and composition of the Association 
to conclude that it was “overborne by the pervasive entwinement of public 
institutions and public officials . . . .”229 In other words, the Association, a 
seemingly private institution, operated as a public, state organization, 
composed of officials that were treated like state employees.230 The Court 
recognized that the Association could not operate without the public school 
officials who overwhelmingly managed the Association.231  
Furthermore, Tennessee’s State Board of Education used its statutory 
authority to expressly delegate power to the Association to regulate 
interscholastic sports among Tennessee public schools.232 The State Board 
of Education later dropped its endorsement of the Association.233 But the 
Court found this irrelevant because a strong relationship still existed 
between the Association and the State. The extensive involvement of public 
 
 221  The “state action” doctrine: private conduct does not have to comply with the Constitution 
while actions of the state have to do so. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES 486 (2d ed. 2002). The rights and liberties granted to individuals by the U.S. Constitution are 
protected only against the government. STEVEN EMANUEL & LAZAR EMANUEL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
417 (Aspen Publishers 26th ed. 2008). Where an individual asserts that his constitutional rights have 
been violated, a court can hear a case only if there has been some participation by the government in the 
challenged activity. Id. 
 222 Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 303 (stating that pervasive entwinement can be shown by 
relevant facts that point to overlapping identity). 
 223 Id. at 312 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 224 Id. at 298 (noting that the inquiry is necessarily fact-bound). The Court made clear that the 
character of an entity is not determined by its characterization in statutory law. Id. at 296. 
 225 Id. at 291. 
 226 Id. at 293. 
 227 Id. 
 228 Id. 
 229 Id. at 298. 
 230 Id. at 300. 
 231 Id. 
 232 See id. at 292 (observing that the State Board of Education had acknowledged the 
Association’s functions by adopting a rule that designated the Association as “the organization to 
supervise and regulate the athletic activities in which the public junior and senior high schools in 
Tennessee participate on an interscholastic basis”). The State Board had the power to revoke that 
designation by its own will. Id. 
 233 Id. at 300. 
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employees at every level of the Association was a meaningful indicator of 
entwinement.234 The private character of the Association merely masked 
the State’s role, as the Association was acting as an arm of the State 
through the Board of Education. The particular facts of Brentwood are not 
significant to this Comment’s analysis of copyright preemption, but the 
Court’s logic of how the private athletic association came to be “charged 
with a public character” provides insight into how a copyright claim can be 
masked as a state claim.235 
The Brentwood court determined that “entwinement” is appropriate 
when the facts justify labeling “an ostensibly private action as public 
instead.”236 “[T]he relevant facts [may] show pervasive entwinement to the 
point of largely overlapping identity . . . .”237 In other words, complete 
entwinement might render two identities completely indistinguishable.238 
But the Court also suggested that entwinement could be unwound if there 
was an offsetting reason to differentiate the two identities.239 The Court 
appears to indicate that an element may exist that takes private action out of 
the public sphere in the same way that an “extra element” can save a state 
law claim from federal copyright preemption. The Court’s reasoning might 
be summed up with the duck test: “If it looks like a duck, swims like a 
duck, and quacks like a duck, then it is probably a duck.”240 If it looks like 
state action, and acts like state action, then it is probably state action. 
Focusing on the Brentwood court’s interpretation of what it means for 
two separate entities to be so entwined as to be inseparable, this Comment 
proposes to apply the “pervasive entwinement” test to the analysis of 
copyright preemption. The central question is whether copyright law is so 
 
 234 Id. at 301–02. 
 235 Id. It is particularly relevant that the Brentwood case did not set out any concrete factors or 
elements as part of the “pervasive entwinement” test. See id. at 303 (“[N]o one criterion must 
necessarily be applied.”). It focuses on the facts themselves to determine the real character of the entity 
and describes entwinement as a general concept in an indirect way. Id. at 295 (“[N]o one fact can 
function as a necessary condition across the board for finding state action; nor is any set of 
circumstances absolutely sufficient . . . .”). 
 236 Id. at 303. 
 237 Id. 
 238 See id. at 300 (explaining that the minority of private schools kept the private organization 
from being characterized as “public,” which kept total entwinement—where the identities of the private 
organization and the State are totally indistinguishable—from occurring). 
 239 Id. at 291, 303 (holding that the private organization’s activity should be treated as that of the 
State due to the pervasive entwinement of state officials in the organization and the absence of any 
reason to see the organization’s actions in any other way). 
 240 See Bruce W. Jentleson, Beware the Duck Test, 34 WASH. QUARTERLY 137, 137 (Summer 
2011) available at http://csis.org/files/publication/twq11summerjentleson_0.pdf (explaining the origins 
of the duck test). The duck test was proposed by a U.S. ambassador to explain why the United States 
was scheming to take down the Guatemalan government: “Many times it is impossible to prove legally 
that a certain individual is a communist; but for cases of this sort I recommend a practical method of 
detection—the ‘duck test’ . . . .[If a] bird certainly looks like a duck. Also, he goes to the pond and you 
notice he swims like a duck . . . . Well, by this time you’ve probably reached the conclusion that the 
bird is a duck, whether he’s wearing a label or not.” Id. (quoting WALTER LAFEBER, INEVITABLE 
REVOLUTIONS: THE UNITED STATES IN CENTRAL AMERICA 115–16 (W.W. Norton & Company 2d ed. 
1993). 
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entwined with a state law claim as to subject the claim to preemption. 
Similar to its application in Brentwood, the entwinement test will continue 
to uphold the fact-specific analysis used by many courts to find an “extra 
element” and thus refrain from adopting a bright-line rule.241  
The entwinement test will measure the degree to which federal 
copyright law overcomes the identity of a state law cause of action.242 
Complete entwinement would occur where copyright law completely 
subsumes the state law claim, resulting in automatic preemption. For 
example, in an action for breach of confidence where the plaintiff’s only 
claim is that the defendant took the plaintiff’s materials and copied the 
content and ideas thereby breaking the plaintiff’s confidence, copyright law 
overrides the breach of confidence claim.243 Without showing any evidence 
that a confidential relationship existed, copyright law is the only source of 
authority that the plaintiff can rely on to assert his grievance in court. A 
breach of confidence action requires a confidential relationship, but if no 
such relationship exists, the plaintiff cannot use it as a weapon for 
protection against a defendant’s unlawful use.244 Copyright law would be 
the plaintiff’s most powerful resource, which he could employ to obtain a 
remedy and reclaim his rights. It dictates the outcome where a copyright 
thief impedes the plaintiff’s ability to control how his work is used.245 
Copyright law, therefore, takes over the state law claim and preempts it 
when complete entwinement occurs. The complete opposite takes place 
when the two claims are not entwined: state law rules and there is no 
preemption. 
As an alternative to the “extra element” test, the entwinement test will 
not necessarily draw a conclusion of whether a definitive “extra element” 
exists or not. Instead, the “extra element” test will be folded into the 
“pervasive entwinement” test. If a fact or set of facts unveils something 
 
 241 See Bohannan, supra note 67, at 619 (“Categorical approaches to the issue of contract 
preemption are antithetical to preemption law.”). A categorical rule based on the type of state law claim 
is not helpful because it is possible for a state law claim to be found preempted in some situations and 
not preempted in other situations, depending on the facts at hand. For example, a claim for conversion 
is usually a distinct tort, but it can be preempted if it is alleged that a defendant used and distributed the 
work. Dielsi v. Falk, 916 F. Supp. 985, 992 (C.D. Cal. 1996). 
 242 See supra note 222 and accompanying text. 
 243 See Idema v. Dreamworks, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1191 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (examining the 
plaintiff’s allegations of a breach of confidence claim where no “extra element” was found, even though 
many courts have found that in a breach of confidence claim, the “extra element” is the confidential 
relationship or mutual understanding between the parties). 
 244 “An actionable breach of confidence will arise when an idea, whether or not protectable, is 
offered to another in confidence, and is voluntarily received by the offeree . . . [and used] for purposes 
beyond the limits of the confidence without the offeror’s permission.” Tele-Count Eng’rs, Inc. v. Pac. 
Tel. & Tel. Co., 214 Cal. Rptr. 276, 279 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). A breach of confidence claim focuses on 
the nature of the relationship between the parties to the agreement. Rokos v. Peck, 227 Cal. Rptr. 480, 
489 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). 
 245 See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 
U. PA. L. REV. 549, 557 (2008) (noting that the structural format of the Copyright Act “leans toward 
protection”). 
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akin to an “extra element,” entwinement is unwound as the state law claim 
becomes more distinct from a copyright claim. But if the facts show no 
“extra element,” the analysis does not end there. The “pervasive 
entwinement” test will measure the degree to which a state-created right is 
established, rather than whether it exists or not (which is what the “extra 
element” test does). In other words, if it looks like copyright infringement 
and acts like copyright infringement, then it probably is copyright 
infringement.246 
B. The Meaning of “Pervasive Entwinement” for Implied Contracts of 
Payment in the Entertainment Industry 
Applying the “pervasive entwinement” test to breach of implied 
contract cases means evaluating the extent to which an implied contract has 
created a right distinct from the rights asserted under copyright law. The 
test will measure the strength with which the right to be paid has been 
established. This will essentially come down to the expectations of 
payment (the expectation of receiving payment and the expectation of 
giving payment) between the parties involved.247 A plaintiff who has 
proven a mutual understanding of the circumstances surrounding payment 
in exchange for use would be justified in utilizing contract law to assert his 
right to payment. In such an instance, contract law is the more appropriate 
authority to obtain a remedy because it governs a bargained-for exchange 
between two parties where expectations are thwarted.248 Copyright law 
does not completely account for the situation because the right to regulate 
the use of a work is only one component of the dispute; the mutual 
expectation of the right to be paid is the other component.249 Where the 
dual expectations of payment have not been recognized, or only minimally 
established as part of an exchange, copyright law governs the reclamation 
of rights to use a work.250 Copyright law is more pervasively entwined in 
the alleged state law claim and preemption occurs. Therefore, the pervasive 
entwinement test in the context of implied contracts will require an analysis 
of each party’s expectations. 
This Comment proposes not only to advance the entwinement test 
utilized in constitutional law but also to set forth factors to guide the 
analysis. The absence of a clear road-map in fact-specific, “extra element” 
 
 246 See supra note 240. 
 247 See BREIMER, supra note 11, at 168 (concluding that a contract can be established if it is clear 
that the person disclosing an idea will be paid if the idea is used). 
 248 See MILLER, supra note 16, at 35 (explaining that under contract law, the party who made the 
offer receives goods or services and the party who accepts the offer receives payment). 
 249 See Bohannan, supra note 67, at 643 (explaining that contracts usually contain an additional 
promise that is different in some way from the promise to not infringe an exclusive right of copyright). 
 250 See Copyright Basics, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 2, http://copyright.gov/circs/ 
circ1.pdf (last reviewed May 2012) (stating that copyright protection begins at the time the work is 
created and the copyright immediately becomes the author’s property so that only the author or those 
that receive rights through the author can rightfully claim copyright). 
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preemption cases have led to the distinct split among the circuits.251 The 
courts, employing a fact-specific analysis, have not articulated any method 
of how they arrived at their conclusions.252 As previously stated, 
categorical rules are the closest mechanism to a formulaic approach of 
preemption: state law claims are always or never preempted.253 This 
Comment resists the categorical rules in favor of a factual analysis and 
further proposes four factors in considering whether a state law claim is 
equivalent to a copyright infringement claim: (1) the history of the 
relationship between the plaintiff and defendant, (2) the extent to which the 
plaintiff and defendant are close to finalizing a deal, (3) the components of 
the plaintiff’s allegations, and (4) the predominant rights to be protected in 
the implied contract claim. The first two factors focus on the relationship 
between the plaintiff and defendant rather than explicitly on whether a 
copyright infringement claim and a state law claim intersect. But resolving 
the state of the plaintiff’s and defendant’s expectations contributes to 
measuring the extent to which a contract claim and a copyright claim are 
entwined. The expectation levels of each party influence the type of claim 
the plaintiff can pursue and the area of law under which the plaintiff can 
best achieve relief. 
1.  First Factor: Course of Dealing Between the Plaintiff and 
Defendant 
An implied contract for payment is based on the circumstances 
surrounding the idea disclosure.254 One such circumstance is the history of 
the relationship between a plaintiff and defendant.255 As two parties come 
into frequent contact with each other and engage in business deals, each 
develops a better understanding of what the other expects from a 
transaction.256 Included in those expectations are the details surrounding 
compensation.257 The payment terms are controlled by the relationship 
 
 251 See Bohannan, supra note 67, at 643 (stating that the “extra element” test is malleable and 
provides little guidance to courts in determining whether claims should be preempted). 
 252 Id. at 627–28 (noting that it is unclear if the courts have done away with the “extra element” 
test or have applied the “extra element” test in a different way, but it is clear that courts have not 
analyzed equivalency in a technical way). 
 253 See id. at 629 (noting that the court’s analysis of preemption in breach of contract claims is 
more categorical than the analysis of preemption in other state law claims). 
 254 See Thompson v. Cal. Brewing Co., 12 Cal. Rptr. 783, 786 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961) (stating that 
the person who suggests an idea has a right to be paid when the circumstances of disclosing the idea 
demonstrate that an agreement to be paid can be implied); Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d 257, 270 (Cal. 
1956) (explaining that a breach of contract claim can arise in a context where a contract can be implied 
from the circumstances before and after disclosure, conveying the conduct of the offeree or offeror who 
suggest they understand there is an obligation to pay at stake). 
 255 See supra notes 10–16 and accompanying text. 
 256 See Vanderpool v. Higgs, 690 P.2d 391, 392 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984) (“Contract law protects the 
expectation interest of contracting parties based on a voluntary agreement that defines their 
relationship.”). 
 257 See Lowe, supra note 178, at 37, 40 (explaining that people with ideas do not want to prevent 
the use of ideas but simply want to be paid for the use of that idea). 
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between both parties and how they have negotiated in the past.258 If the 
plaintiff brings a cause of action where the right to payment is in dispute, 
but the right has been recognized and successfully executed in similar past 
circumstances, the plaintiff should be justified in using contract law to 
enforce the right of payment because the expectations are clear.259 
Entwinement is weak because copyright law does not govern the entire 
transaction; copyright law is only one piece of the transaction.260 Contract 
law is therefore necessary to protect the established right of payment, a 
right that is nowhere included in copyright law.261 The plaintiff and 
defendant’s course of dealing implicates the plaintiff’s payment right 
because the defendant’s understanding and past acceptance of the right 
distinguishes the contract claim from a copyright claim. 
A plaintiff who has had no prior course of dealing with the defendant 
has neither established an expectation of payment nor arranged an accepted 
payment procedure.262 The mutual understanding that accompanies the 
formation of an implied contract is demonstrated by words and actions.263 
But if a plaintiff and defendant have never transacted with one another, the 
plaintiff has no basis on which to interpret the defendant’s words and 
actions. Such foundational knowledge would typically help the plaintiff 
decipher the defendant’s expectation to pay for the use of an idea.264 The 
plaintiff cannot use contract law to protect a right that the defendant does 
not know exists. As a result, it appears as if the plaintiff is merely 
protecting his rights as a copyright holder. Any state law claim the plaintiff 
asserts will have the identity of a copyright claim. Copyright law therefore 
becomes the primary foundation of the plaintiff’s claim and preempts the 
cause of action.  
 
 258 See Stephen W. Ranere, Note, Charting a Course: How Courts Should Interpret Course of 
Dealing in a Battle-of-Forms Dispute, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 671, 675–77 (2008) (explaining that 
“course of dealing” can help interpret ambiguous terms of a contract based on evidence of prior 
dealings and that “course of dealing” can supply additional terms to the contract). 
 259 See Citizens Util. Co. v. Wheeler, 319 P.2d 763, 769 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d 1957) (“The price may 
be fixed by the contract, or may be left to be fixed in such manner as may be agreed, or it may be 
determined by the course of dealing between the parties.”); see also GUNNAR ERICKSON, HARRIS 
TULCHIN & MARK HALLORAN, THE INDEPENDENT FILM PRODUCER’S SURVIVAL GUIDE 59 (2d ed. 
2005) (“What makes contracts potent is that our legal system is designed to support contracts by 
providing a mechanism—lawsuits—to enforce them if one side does not fulfill its promise.”). 
 260 See supra notes 161–162 and accompanying text. 
 261 See Vanderpool, 690 P.2d at 392 (noting that where a breach is found, the fulfillment of the 
expectation interest gives the injured party the benefit of the bargain and puts him in the position he 
would have been in if there had been no breach). 
 262 See Citizens Util. Co., 319 P.2d at 769 (finding the court cannot set a price when there was no 
established market price, prior course of dealings, or industry practice); see also Baumgold Bros., Inc. 
v. Allan M. Fox Co., E., 375 F. Supp. 807, 813 (N.D. Ohio 1973) (demonstrating that the understanding 
of the parties is established by prior course of dealing). 
 263 See Johnson v. Nasi, 309 P.2d 380, 383 (Wash. 1957) (“An implied contract or mutual 
understanding to pay for services rendered is not established in the absence of particular facts indicating 
such mutual understanding . . . .”). 
 264 See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 166 (5th ed. 2003) 
(“[B]ehavioral patterns under prior contracts and under the contract are of enormous importance in 
interpreting and supplementing the contract.”). 
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Analyzing the past course of dealing between a plaintiff and defendant 
will determine how expectations are managed between the two parties and 
thus contributes to establishing the identity of a state law claim. 
2.  Second Factor: The Proximity to Making a Deal 
As the plaintiff and defendant approach a finalized deal, the 
expectations of payment become clearer.265 Where a defendant expresses 
his interest in the plaintiff’s idea and encourages the plaintiff to further 
expand the idea or to take action beyond merely disclosing the idea, the 
defendant would be foolish to assume the plaintiff would perform those 
services for free.266 The defendant’s affirmative step to actively involve the 
plaintiff in development demonstrates an understanding that the plaintiff 
would eventually have to be compensated.267 The plaintiff rightfully has an 
expectation that the work he completed specifically for the defendant 
would result in payment.268 
The plaintiff and defendant would rely on contract law rather than 
copyright law to protect these expectations. For the plaintiff, copyright law 
will sufficiently protect a plaintiff’s work only up to the point that a 
payment right becomes clear. When the plaintiff has initiated work for the 
defendant beyond idea disclosure, contract law ensures that the plaintiff 
will get paid for performing the work. For the defendant, contract law 
protects the defendant’s right to receive the plaintiff’s work in exchange for 
money. Therefore, as the payment right becomes clear, copyright law is 
unwound from entwinement with the state law claim, leaving the plaintiff 
free to pursue a breach of implied contract claim. 
Furthermore, as the contact between the plaintiff and defendant 
becomes frequent, negotiations progress, and the business relationship 
develops, the likelihood of discussing payment becomes unavoidable. The 
frequency, extent and nature of contact between the plaintiff and defendant 
contribute to the likelihood that “the defendant knows or should know the 
plaintiff expects payment,” an element of an implied-in-fact contract.269 As 
the right of payment starts to become more defined between both parties, 
 
 265 See KELLY CHARLES CRABB, THE MOVIE BUSINESS 28 (2005) (explaining that if the defendant 
accepts the material, there is some understanding that he will give something of value to the submitter 
and the details are left to hash out at a later time). 
 266 See Anschell, Hodulik & Rohrer, supra note 14, at 26 (explaining that if a plaintiff can 
demonstrate that the defendant went beyond attending a pitch meeting but took affirmative steps to 
accept the idea or form a written agreement, the claim has a better chance of surviving preemption); see 
also Miller, supra note 16, at 34 (explaining that in addition to a basic offer of “We want you to write 
and produce a theme song for our current production[,]” the offer will indicate how much the company 
is willing to pay). 
 267 See Anschell, Hodulik & Rohrer, supra note 14, at 26–27 (“The closer the parties come to 
reaching an agreement on the terms of an express contract, the more likely it is that the idea submission 
claims will survive a preemption challenge.”). 
 268 See PERILLO, supra note 264, at 840 (stating that “[a] contractual duty is discharged by 
performance” and that  “[a] frequent method of performance is payment”).  
 269 Young v. Young, 191 P.3d 1258, 1263 (Wash. 2008). 
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contract law becomes a natural tool to protect the plaintiff if the right is 
infringed.270 Copyright law would no longer be the proper mechanism to 
protect the plaintiff’s rights over his work.271 
Fischer might have turned out differently if it was analyzed using this 
factor. The plaintiff developed materials (script, character description, five-
minute video for the defendant) for his animated character team, “‘Steve & 
Bluey,”‘ with the influence of the defendant.272 Nickelodeon’s interest in 
the plaintiff’s idea and inducement to expand the idea indicated that the 
defendant wanted the plaintiff to perform a service for the defendant.273 
The average person who performs a service in a business transaction would 
expect payment.274 The series of correspondence between the plaintiff and 
defendant slowly built up expectations of what the parties wanted from 
each other. Copyright law cannot protect this expectation in a business 
transaction.275 
Where the plaintiff may have only submitted his idea without any 
response from the defendant or received an outright refusal of the 
submission, the plaintiff will probably find himself in the same situation as 
the Selby plaintiff with no acknowledgement from the defendant of the 
payment right.276 Without the payment right, the plaintiff’s only remaining 
claim would be the defendant’s improper use of the work without 
authorization.277 Copyright law would constitute the governing authority, 
thereby preempting any breach of contract claim.278 Regardless, the 
plaintiff would most likely fail in his state claim because it would be 
difficult for the plaintiff to prove one of the elements of an implied-in-fact 
contract in the entertainment industry: that the defendant accepted the 
 
 270 See ERICKSON ET AL., supra note 259, at 59 (“If there is doubt about what terms the parties 
agreed to or whether they ever created a contract by simultaneously agreeing on the terms, a judge is 
unlikely to enforce the deal.”). 
 271 See Lowe, supra note 178, at 41–42 (observing that the plaintiff is not seeking copyright 
remedies but contract remedies such as “the benefit of the bargain”). 
 272 Fischer v. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d 535, 538 (D. Md. 2000). 
 273 See LITWAK, supra note 36, at 2 (noting that “if a party makes what appears to be an offer, and 
the other party accepts it, the offerer will be bound by the contract even if he doesn’t want to make a 
contract”); MILLER, supra note 16, at 34 (describing how an offer initiating a transaction is as simple as 
saying, “We want you to do this for us.”). 
 274  See supra note 268 and accompanying text. 
 275 Copyright law generally does not include the right to be paid. See Kenneth D. Crews, Museum 
Policies and Art Images: Conflicting Objectives and Copyright Overreaching, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 795, 826 (2012). 
 276 See CRABB, supra note 265, at 26 (noting that a producer will always clarify that “no 
agreement is created by the submission alone; there must be a future negotiation and a written 
agreement”); ERICKSON ET AL., supra note 259, at 59 (finding that if the most critical term of the 
contract, the amount to be paid, is missing, a judge will not set the price and enforce the contract). 
 277 See MILLER, supra note 16, at 102 (stating that as part of the copyright holder’s right to control 
his work, the owner can authorize others to “copy, distribute, and adapt their work”); CRABB, supra 
note 265, at 26 (clarifying that the producer has no obligation to the submitter). 
 278 See MILLER, supra note 16, at 102 (explaining that a copyright protects a producer’s rights to 
control and profit from their work). 
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disclosure knowing the conditions.279 If the plaintiff has received a denial or 
no response from the defendant, the defendant most certainly has not 
accepted the disclosure.  
Focusing on the timeline of the transaction and examining the 
eventuality of a deal closing would guide the courts in determining how 
each party’s expectations are defined. The closer that the parties are to 
closing a deal, the more likely that one of the parties will be paid. The 
further away they are from reaching a deal, the less likely the payment 
terms will be defined. 
3.  Third Factor: Components of the Plaintiff’s Allegations 
The plaintiff’s allegations will reveal the true nature of the plaintiff’s 
contract claim and whether copyright law is entwined with the claim. Since 
the court only looks at the facts presented by the plaintiffs and defendants, 
the court can determine whether an exchange exists between the parties. 
The pervasiveness of an exchange finds more support in contract law than 
copyright law. Copyright law does not purport to regulate the 
circumstances of an exchange; contract law does. A clear exchange 
between two parties would distinguish a state claim from the principles of 
copyright. 
The court should look to whether the plaintiff’s complaint is focused 
towards proving the elements of a contract such as mutual assent and 
consideration (money in exchange for rights), or whether the complaint 
concentrates on proving the plaintiff’s right to control his allegedly 
infringed work. If the plaintiff’s complaint is overborne by facts that cater 
to the latter, any breach of contract claim the plaintiff alleges will be 
entwined with copyright. It would be difficult to separate a copyright claim 
from a breach of contract claim where the plaintiff predominantly alleges 
he can no longer use the work as he wishes. The plaintiff should, therefore, 
rely on copyright law to assert his grievance because his state law claim 
will be preempted. But if a plaintiff’s complaint asserts an exchange that 
was supposed to take place, it may be easier to separate any copyright 
issues from breach of contract issues. The plaintiff could then look to the 
tenets of contract law to assert his claim. Nevertheless, whether a plaintiff 
can look to state law or federal copyright law will depend on an intensive 
examination of the allegations asserted in the complaint. 
4.  Fourth Factor: The Predominant Rights Protected in an Implied 
Contract Claim  
This last factor relies on other circumstances or facts of a case that 
may establish dual expectations of payment. Where the plaintiff can prove 
that the right of payment has assumed a distinct identity from the right to 
 
 279 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
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control use of the copyrighted work, the plaintiff will have a stronger 
chance of escaping preemption. No matter how the plaintiff labels the state 
claim on the pleading or describes the rights he seeks to be protected, the 
deciding court must focus its analysis on the actual relationship between 
the rights asserted under state law and copyright.280 The plaintiff’s goal 
should be to distinguish the rights asserted under state law from federal 
rights under copyright law as much as possible.281 
5.  Balancing the Factors 
This Comment proposes that the factors discussed above be examined 
together in totality to conclude whether preemption is proper. For example, 
if there is no history of a relationship between the plaintiff and defendant, 
the plaintiff will have a greater burden to prove that the parties are close to 
reaching a deal. Or if the parties are nowhere close to reaching a deal but 
the circumstances demonstrate knowledge by each party that payment is to 
occur at some point in the future, the balance will tip towards enforcement 
of the right under state law. This is to ensure that the parties actually 
recognize the right of payment. The factors will require courts to look at all 
the circumstances of a particular case rather than resorting to a bright-line 
rule. The more heavily the factors weigh in favor of pervasive entwinement 
and an indistinguishable identity shared between state-created rights and 
federal copyright, the greater the chances of preemption. Conversely, the 
more distinct and recognized the state rights become, the greater chance 
that the state claim survives preemption.  
Although the “pervasive entwinement” test in the context of 
constitutional law has been criticized for being unclear and vague,282 it can 
be argued that any fact-specific analysis potentially carries the same issues. 
For example, one criticism of the “extra element” test is that it lacks 
guidance since there is always some difference between state law and 
copyright law to take the claim out of preemption.283 A small difference can 
be grounds for finding an “extra element,” allowing many state claims to 
survive preemption and potentially rendering preemption useless. The 
“pervasive entwinement” test attempts to address this problem by 
examining the degree to which an “extra element” exists rather than if one 
exists or not. This Comment uses the “pervasive entwinement” test as a 
jumping off point. It attempts to offset the concerns of the “pervasive 
 
 280 See Briarpatch Ltd. v. Phoenix Pictures, Inc., 373 F.3d 296, 307 (2d Cir. 2004) (concluding 
that the underlying right the plaintiff seeks to vindicate takes the claim outside of preemption). 
 281 The plaintiff’s goal is to “un-entwine” and to find an offsetting reason that would distinguish 
the two claims. 
 282 See Mastrogiovanni, supra note 220, at 740 (stating that the Supreme Court does little to 
clarify entwinement, which leads to the theory’s vague scope). 
 283 See Moore, supra note 82, at 204 (concluding that the “extra element” to avoid preemption can 
be a small difference between state law and copyright). 
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entwinement” test by using factors that will lend some clarity and serve as 
a blueprint to the preemption analysis. 
CONCLUSION 
Copyright preemption of a state law claim has plagued the courts and 
entertainment industry professionals for quite some time. The split among 
the circuits regarding which test to apply and how to apply the test has led 
to inconsistent results. Some courts have tried to adopt categorical rules, 
which only frustrates the quest for guidance. Many courts have followed a 
fact-heavy analysis without offering any guideposts as to how they 
synthesized the facts to achieve their conclusion. A clear test focused on 
the facts but with defined factors to structure the analysis is necessary. The 
“pervasive entwinement” test used in constitutional law describes a 
situation where two entities are so alike that they are indistinguishable. By 
merging the two areas of constitutional law and copyright law, 
constitutional law could facilitate development in an area of copyright that 
courts have been unable to resolve. The “pervasive entwinement” test could 
be customized to copyright law with the use of factors to guide the test. The 
proposed factors to be utilized in analyzing breach of implied contract 
claims for preemption are tailored to the entertainment industry. While it is 
not for the judiciary to predict the future, it can examine the course of 
dealing between the two parties, the extent of the parties’ working 
relationship on the particular project, the plaintiff’s immediate allegations, 
and other facts or circumstances that contribute to demonstrating that a 
mutual expectation of payment exists. The proposed test will maintain an 
emphasis on the facts of each particular case while providing courts with a 
touchstone that they can use time and time again. 
 
